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CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN LIVING COLOR 
VINAY HARPALANI∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article will examine how American civil rights law has 
treated “color” discrimination and differentiated it from “race” 
discrimination.  It is a comprehensive analysis of the changing le-
gal meaning of “color” discrimination throughout American his-
tory.  The Article will cover views of “color” in the antebellum era, 
Reconstruction laws, early equal protection cases, the U.S. Cen-
sus, modern civil rights statutes, and in People v. Bridgeforth—a 
landmark 2016 ruling by the New York Court of Appeals.  First, 
the Article will lay out the complex relationship between race and 
color and discuss the phenomenon of colorism—oppression based 
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on skin color—as differentiated from racism.  It then will analyze 
“color” in Reconstruction Era anti-discrimination laws, examin-
ing how both “race” and “color” came to be included in these 
laws.  It will illustrate that under early equal protection cases, pro-
hibitions on “race” and “color” discrimination both aimed to curb 
racism.  “Race” and “color” were equally important, but under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, “color” discrimination never devel-
oped any meaning independent of “race” discrimination.  The Ar-
ticle will show how “color” began disappearing from equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, just as civil rights efforts to address race 
discrimination became successful.  It will then discuss how 
“color” reemerged in cases involving modern civil rights statutes 
and how these cases define “color” discrimination differently, fo-
cusing on colorism rather than racism.  Additionally, color dis-
crimination claims under these statutes have only applied to an in-
dividual member of one racial subclass, such as a dark-skinned 
Black plaintiff.  However, in Bridgeforth, the Court of Appeals rec-
ognized a multiracial color class, composed of a group of dark-
skinned individuals of different races, for equal protection-based 
Batson challenges to juror exclusion.  Bridgeforth was the first 
case to allow Batson challenges for color discrimination, and the 
first color discrimination case under any law to recognize a multi-
racial color class.  This Article will consider the potential of mul-
tiracial color classes for the future of civil rights law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2016, the New York Court of Appeals issued a landmark 
civil rights ruling.  With its decision in People v. Bridgeforth,1 the Court of 
Appeals held that skin color discrimination is cognizable for Batson v. Ken-
tucky2 challenges to juror exclusion.3  Batson challenges derive from the 
                                                          
 1.  69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016).  
 2.  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 3.  See id. at 96 (laying out three-step framework to address race discrimination in jury selec-
tion).  Under Batson, if a peremptory challenge by the government is at issue, defendant must make 
a prima facie case by: (1) establishing that defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group (or 
other protected group); (2) showing that the government’s peremptory challenges excluded mem-
bers of this cognizable group; and (3) putting forth facts to show that the government’s peremptory 
challenges were motivated by the race (or other protected status).  If defendant is able to establish 
this, the burden shifts to the government to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the juror.  Id. 
at 97.  The trial court then must decide if the government’s articulated race-neutral reason is valid 
or pretextual.  Id. at 98.  
Legal scholars have critiqued the Batson framework, contending it usually does not aid crim-
inal defendants.  See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About 
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 459 (1996) (finding in the seven 
years after the Batson decision, criminal defendants succeeded in only 15.87% of Batson chal-
lenges); Tania Tetlow, Solving Batson, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1859, 1859 (2015) (noting Batson 
“has failed to meaningfully reform jury selection”).  This Article is not primarily concerned with 
Batson per se, but rather with the general recognition of skin color discrimination in civil rights law 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause in the U.S. Constitution, 
and New York has incorporated Batson’s doctrine into its state law.4  In 
Bridgeforth, the New York Court of Appeals found that the exclusion of a 
class of dark-skinned jurors of different races violates the New York Consti-
tution’s Equal Protection Clause and section 13 of New York’s Civil Rights 
Law.5  It was a “precedent-setting decision”—the first application of Batson 
specifically to skin color discrimination.6 
However, Bridgeforth’s significance goes well beyond Batson.  Skin 
color discrimination, as a claim independent from race discrimination, has 
only been recognized under a few civil rights statutes,7 most notably Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8  Under these statutes, courts have inter-
preted the term “color” narrowly to apply only to discrimination against a 
plaintiff belonging to a subclass of one race: for example, a dark-skinned 
African American.  Additionally, courts had only recognized such color dis-
crimination claims for individual plaintiffs.  But Bridgeforth recognized a 
multiracial color class—composed of a group of dark-skinned individuals of 
different races.  In doing so, the case opens up possibilities for expanding 
color-based anti-discrimination law. 
Some legal scholars have focused on color discrimination under Title 
VII and other civil rights statutes,9 and various scholars have written about 
colorism as a historical and sociological phenomenon which parallels rac-
ism.10  Building on these works, this Article will add several new dimensions.  
                                                          
(and specifically the recognition of a multiracial color class made up of individuals of different 
races). 
 4.  People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y. 1990).  
 5.  Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 613. 
 6.  See Press Release, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Akin Gump Pens Amicus Brief 
in Precedent-Setting Decision by N.Y. Court of Appeals That Skin Color Cannot Be Used as Crite-
rion for Excluding Jurors (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/akin-
gump-pens-amicus-brief-in-precedent-setting-decision-by-ny.html.  
 7.  See infra Part V. 
 8.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
 9.  See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1705 (2000); Leonard M. Baynes, If It’s Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness 
Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color 
Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131 (1997); Kate Sablosky Elengold, Branding Identity, 93 DENV. 
L. REV. 1 (2015); Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in the 
New Century, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 52 (2008); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The 
Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000); Cynthia E. Nance, Colorable Claims: The Continuing 
Significance of Color Under Title VII Forty Years After Its Passage, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 435 (2005). 
 10.  COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA (Kim-
berly Jade Norwood ed., 2014); MARGARET L. HUNTER, RACE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF 
SKIN TONE (2005); NINA G. JABLONSKI, LIVING COLOR: THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL MEANING 
OF SKIN COLOR (2012); KATHY RUSSELL, MIDGE WILSON & RONALD HALL, THE COLOR 
COMPLEX (REVISED): THE POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR IN A NEW MILLENNIUM (2013); SHADES OF 
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It will analyze the changing legal meaning of “color” discrimination in civil 
rights law, from the antebellum period to the Reconstruction Era to modern 
statutes.  In doing so, it is the first scholarly work to examine color discrimi-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause—a long-lost twin of the more fa-
miliar race discrimination claims.11  Color-based equal protection existed 
long before Bridgeforth, albeit in a different form that was coterminous with 
race-based equal protection.  The Article will show how “color” was gradu-
ally subsumed by “race” in equal protection jurisprudence, until its 
reemergence in Bridgeforth.  By examining this history, this Article will also 
illuminate the changing legal meaning of “color,” which was once used to 
represent race and now specifically designates skin color.  The Article will 
show how Bridgeforth forms a bridge between these two meanings through 
its recognition of a multiracial color class.  Finally, the Article will lay out 
the potential of multiracial color classes for civil rights law and posit initial 
strategies to begin realizing this potential. 
Part I will delineate the complex relationship between race and color 
terminology—particularly the ambiguous use of the term “color.”  This Part 
will show how “race” and “color” were used interchangeably in the U.S. Cen-
sus.  It also will discuss the phenomenon of colorism—oppression based on 
skin color, as differentiated from racism,12 and it will consider the relation-
ship between racism and colorism. 
Part II will analyze color in the antebellum period and will examine Re-
construction Era anti-discrimination laws, including the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  It first will consider 
how race and color intersected in antebellum law, showing how “color” was 
sometimes used interchangeably with “race” and other times used specifi-
cally to denote skin color.  Against this backdrop, Part II will illustrate that 
in the Reconstruction Era, protections against color discrimination focused 
                                                          
DIFFERENCE, WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 2009); Suzanne G. Fegley 
et al., Colorism Embodied: Skin Tone and Psychosocial Well-Being in Adolescence, in 
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMBODIMENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS 281 (Willis F. Overton 
et al. eds., 2008). 
 11.  Scholars have paid relatively little attention to “color” in Reconstruction Era laws.  Profes-
sor Trina Jones does note use of the term “color” in the Fifteenth Amendment.  See Jones, supra 
note 9, at 1532 n.188.  However, Professor Jones focuses mainly on the history of colorism, color 
claims under modern civil rights statutes, and prospects for future claims under these statutes, rather 
than on the text and application of Reconstruction Era laws.  See generally Jones, supra note 9.  
Also, Emily Rose Margolis wrote a student note which focused specifically on extending Bridge-
forth to other states.  See Emily Rose Margolis, Note, Color as a Batson Class in California, 106 
CAL. L. REV. 2067 (2018) (arguing that California and other states should recognize color as Batson 
class).  Margolis’ work covers only Batson rather than all of equal protection doctrine, and it focuses 
on state law rather than the federal Constitution. 
 12.  See infra Part I.B for a more detailed explanation of colorism. 
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on racism, not on colorism.  This Part also will consider how the Reconstruc-
tion Framers came to include both “race” and “color” in their legal enact-
ments.13  
Parts III and IV will focus on color under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Part III will show how early equal protection cases considered both race and 
color discrimination together and that both were treated as manifestations of 
racism.  Color and race were equally important, but color did not develop a 
legal meaning independent of race.  Eventually, as Part IV will illustrate, the 
Supreme Court began to use the term “color” less frequently, and race sub-
sumed color in equal protection jurisprudence. 
Part V will consider color discrimination claims that have emerged un-
der modern application of civil rights statutes, particularly Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  This Part will show that modern color anti-dis-
crimination laws target colorism rather than racism.  Cases under these stat-
utes have involved individual dark-skinned or light-skinned plaintiffs, often 
targeted for discrimination by members of their own racial group (for exam-
ple, a light-skinned African American discriminating against a dark-skinned 
African American). 
Part VI will analyze People v. Bridgeforth and discuss how it extends 
the scope of color discrimination protections in civil rights law.  This Part 
will highlight the novel recognition of a multiracial color class, composed of 
a group of dark-skinned individuals of different races, for Batson challenges.  
Such a multiracial class illustrates how “color” provisions can protect against 
more complex forms of discrimination, where members of more than one 
racial group are targeted. 
Finally, Part VII will consider the future of color-based anti-discrimina-
tion law.  It will highlight the potential of multiracial color classes to combat 
discrimination in an increasingly diverse America.  This Part will also posit 
strategies for civil rights advocates to work towards this end. 
                                                          
 13.  This Article does not endorse originalism as the preferred theory of constitutional interpre-
tation.  Rather, consistent with many critics of originalism, it acknowledges that original meaning 
and intent are significant factors to consider in constitutional and statutory interpretation.  See 
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2009) (“Not a single self-
identifying non-originalist of whom I’m aware argues that original meaning has no bearing on 
proper judicial constitutional interpretation.  To the contrary, even those scholars most closely iden-
tified with non-originalism––Paul Brest, David Strauss, Laurence Tribe, for example––explicitly 
assign original meaning or intentions a significant role in the interpretive enterprise.”); David A. 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 881 (1996) (“Virtually 
everyone agrees that the specific intentions of the Framers count for something.”). 
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I.  PROBLEM OF THE “COLOR” LINE 
In his 1903 classic, Souls of Black Folk, renowned African-American 
scholar W.E.B. Du Bois famously stated, “The problem of the twentieth cen-
tury is the problem of the color-line—the relation of the darker to the lighter 
races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.”14  Du 
Bois articulates how “race” and “color” are intricately linked and often used 
interchangeably.  “Color” and color-based terms have a “double-conscious-
ness”15: they can refer either to race or to skin color.16  
This Part examines the dual meaning of “color” to represent race and 
skin color.  It gives examples of when the term “color” actually denotes race, 
and it uses the history of the U.S. Census to illustrate how the government 
has even used “race” and “color” interchangeably.  But it then shows how 
“color” sometimes also specifically designates skin color, differentiated from 
race, and it distinguishes “colorism”—social hierarchy based on skin color—
from racism.  Finally, this Part considers the relationship between racism and 
colorism. 
A.  “Color” as Race 
Color is often used to represent race, and skin color is the physical char-
acteristic most commonly associated with race.  The term “color” itself is 
sometimes used interchangeably with “race”: For example, one definition of 
“color-blind” is one who is “[n]ot influenced by racial prejudice.”17  Color-
                                                          
 14.  W.E.B. DU BOIS, SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (Bantam Books 1989) (1903).   
 15.  “Double-consciousness” is a metaphor for duality—often a conflicted duality.  Id. at 3 (“It 
is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness . . . . One ever feels his two-ness . . . .”).  Another 
example is Rev. Martin Luther King’s iconic “I Have a Dream” speech at the 1963 March on Wash-
ington.  Rev. King famously stated: “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in 
a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.”  
Rev. Martin Luther King, Speech at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Aug. 28, 
1963) (emphasis added), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/i-have-dream-
address-delivered-march-washington-jobs-and-freedom.  Rev. King was referring to the elimination 
of racial segregation, but he used the term “color of their skin” to denote race. 
 16.  One definition of “color” given by the Oxford dictionary is “pigmentation of the skin, es-
pecially as an indication of someone’s race.”  Colour, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddic-
tionaries.com/definition/colour (last visited May 5, 2020).  Another definition is “[a] group of peo-
ple considered as being distinguished by skin pigmentation.”  Id.  The former definition refers 
directly to skin color, but the latter refers to race itself.  “Light-skinned” or “dark-skinned” would 
seem to be an appropriate use of the former definition.  “Black” and “White” would seem to fit the 
second definition, a racial group—although these are color-based terms and are sometimes used to 
denote skin color.  See Jones, supra note 9, at 1534 (“Today, as in 1866, ‘white’ can refer to both a 
racial category and to skin color.”). 
 17.  Colour-blind, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/colour-
blind (last visited May 5, 2020).  Various book titles also use “color” as synonymous with “race.”  
See, e.g., K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY 
OF RACE (1998); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE 
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based language denotes race in common parlance: Color terms such as 
“Black” and “White” commonly designate specific racial groups.18  Other 
color terms used for racial groups include “yellow” for Asian Americans,19 
“red” for Native Americans,20 and “brown” for Latinx21 or South Asian 
Americans.22  Some of these terms are considered to be pejorative, while oth-
ers are in common use.  Additionally, “people of color” and “person of color” 
are terms used to denote all people who are not White.  Today, “person of 
color” is a colloquial term, but in earlier eras it was a legal term defined in 
opposition to “white person.”23  
Historically, the U.S. Census illustrates how race and color have been 
used interchangeably.24  As shown in Figure 1, the 1850 U.S. Census was the 
                                                          
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1980); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); see also Robin A. Lenhardt, 
The Color of Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2071 (2017). 
 18.  “Colored” was once commonly used to refer to people of African descent or other non-
White people.  See Colored, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/defini-
tion/us/colored (last visited May 5, 2020) (giving one “dated, offensive” definition of “colored” as 
“[a] person who is wholly or partly of nonwhite descent.”).  In many states, it was once a legal term 
designating such persons.  See, e.g., STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 237 (Pauli Murray ed., 
Univ. of Ga. Press 1997) (1951) (defining “colored” as “includ[ing] not only Negroes but persons 
of mixed blood having any appreciable amount of Negro blood.” (citing MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263 
(repealed 1987)).  Although “colored” is now considered pejorative in the United States, it is still in 
colloquial usage in some parts of the world.  See Lindsay Johns, Say It Loud, I’m Coloured and I’m 
Proud, ROOT (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:50 AM), https://www.theroot.com/say-it-loud-im-coloured-and-im-
proud-1790898391 (noting “[i]n a South African context, ‘Coloured’ is a wholly acceptable 
word.”).  Moreover, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is 
still the name of a major U.S. civil rights organization.   
 19.  See FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002) (an-
alyzing the plight of Asian Americans). 
 20.  See TROY R. JOHNSON, RED POWER: THE NATIVE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
(2007). 
 21.  OTTO SANTA ANNA, BROWN TIDE RISING: METAPHORS OF LATINOS IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE (2002). 
 22.  See VIJAY PRASHAD, THE KARMA OF BROWN FOLK (2000) (analyzing the plight of South 
Asian Americans). 
 23.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 79-103 (1935) (defining “person[] of color” as “[a]ll Negroes, 
mulattoes, mestizos, and their descendants, having any ascertainable trace of either Negro or Afri-
can, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian blood . . . and all descendants of [such persons] . . . .”) (cited in 
STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18, at 90).  In contrast to this definition of “person 
of color,” the official definition of “White person” in Georgia was:  
[O]nly persons of the white or Caucasian race, who have no ascertainable trace of either 
Negro, African, West Indian, Asiatic Indian, Mongolian, Japanese, or Chinese blood in 
their veins.  No person, any one of whose ancestors has been duly registered with the 
State Bureau of Vital Statistics as a colored person or person of color, shall be deemed a 
white person.  
Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 53-212).  
 24.  See generally Index of Questions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/his-
tory/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/ (last visited May 5, 2020). 
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first to collect information about an individual’s color.25  There was no men-
tion of “race” on the census form, and the options for “Color” were “Black” 
and “Mulatto,” with instruction to leave the column blank if the person was 
“White.”26  The directions for the 1860 census form explicitly added “White” 
as a “Color” category,27 and the 187028 and 188029 census forms added other 
“Color” categories such as “Chinese” and “American Indian.”30  Interest-
ingly, the 1890 census form used “Race” instead of “Color,”31 and census 
forms from 1900 to 1940 collected data on “Color or race.”32  In 1950, the 
census form went back to “Race” only;33 in 1960 it was “Race or color,”34 
and in 1970, it was “Color or race.”35  Subsequent censuses only collected 









                                                          
 25.  1850, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_dec-
ades/index_of_questions/1850_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020).  From 1790 to 1840, the Census 
did not specifically use the terms “race” or “color,” although it did collect data on the number of 
White people, slaves, and in some instances “colored persons.”  See generally Index of Questions, 
supra note 24.  
 26.  1850, supra note 25.  
 27.  1860, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_dec-
ades/index_of_questions/1860_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020).  
 28.  1870, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_dec-
ades/index_of_questions/1870_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020). 
 29.  1880, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_dec-
ades/index_of_questions/1880_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020). 
 30.  Future censuses continued to add and replace categories.  See generally Index of Questions, 
supra note 24. 
 31.  1890, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_dec-
ades/index_of_questions/1890_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020). 
 32.  See generally Index of Questions, supra note 24. 
 33.  1950 (Population), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/his-
tory/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1950_population.html (last visited May 5, 
2020). 
 34.  1960 (Population), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/his-
tory/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1960_population.html (last visited May 5, 
2020). 
 35.  1970 (Population), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/his-
tory/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1970_population.html (last visited May 5, 
2020). 
 36.  See generally Index of Questions, supra note 24. 
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Figure 1: “Race” and “Color” in the U.S. Census 
Year(s) Language on Questionnaire 
1850 – 1880 Color 
1890 Race 
1900 – 1940 Color or Race 
1950 Race 
1960 Race or Color 
1970 Color or Race 
1980 – present Race 
 
The use of color terminology to refer to race came about because 
throughout U.S. history, skin color has served as a proxy for race.37  Race 
actually derives from a complex amalgamation of factors: ancestry, common 
stereotypes, self-identification, and various physical features including skin 
color.38  Racial categories are not biological groupings but rather social con-
structs:39  As the U.S. Census illustrates, these categories can change over 
time.40  Skin color as a proxy for race can be misleading—as with a Black 
person who can “pass” for White.41  Nevertheless, in everyday interactions, 
skin color is often the primary means of identifying a person’s race and dis-
criminating on the basis of race.  Consequently, older civil rights law often 
viewed “color” as interchangeable with “race,” and both race and color anti-
discrimination provisions targeted racism. 
B.  “Color” as Skin Color 
In modern civil rights law, “color” specifically means skin color, not 
merely as a marker of race, but as a separate feature with its own axis of 
                                                          
 37.  See Jones, supra note 9, at 1534 (noting that during the Reconstruction Era, “race and color 
were viewed as overlapping, but nonetheless distinct, phenomena”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Mul-
tiracialism and the Social Construction of Race: The Story of Hudgins v. Wrights, in RACE LAW 
STORIES 147, 148 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008) (noting that “skin color” 
is “the most commonly used proxy for race”).   
 38.  See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (defining “‘race’ as a vast group 
of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of their 
morphology and/or ancestry”); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 37, at 147. 
 39.  See, e.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY 115 (1962) (noting that race is a “social and conventional, not a biological 
concept”); Mary E. Campbell, Jenifer L. Bratter & Wendy D. Roth, Measuring the Diverging Com-
ponents of Race, 60 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 381, 382 (2016). 
 40.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 24–36.  
 41.  “Passing” refers to situations where a Black person (or other person of color) is perceived 
by others as White and tacitly encourages that perception.  See generally ALLYSON HOBBS, A 
CHOSEN EXILE: A HISTORY OF RACIAL PASSING IN AMERICAN LIFE (2014). 
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discrimination and inequality.42  Colorism typically refers to social hierarchy 
and oppression based on skin color,43 as opposed to race itself.44  Often, but 
not always, this involves favoring individuals with lighter skin over those 
with darker skin.45  Such discrimination is the target of modern color anti-
discrimination provisions. 
Colorism is often framed as a within-group phenomenon: for example, 
light-skinned Black Americans discriminating against dark-skinned Black 
Americans, or vice versa.46  However, outgroup members such as White 
Americans can also specifically favor Black Americans who are lighter or 
darker,47 and this can make it more difficult to distinguish between colorism 
and racism. 
Colorism has long existed in societies across the world,48 and it is woven 
together with racism in various ways.49  In the United States, colorism has its 
                                                          
 42.  Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Where Is the Love? A Rejoinder by Bonilla-Silva on the Latin 
Americanization Thesis, 5 RACE & SOC’Y 103, 110 (2002) (arguing that “color is a central feature 
of social stratification”). 
 43.  See Leila Nadya Sadat, Introduction: From Ferguson to Geneva and Back Again, 14 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 549, 550–51 (2015).   
 44.  See Jones, supra note 9, at 1490 (noting that “color differences are still frequently used as 
a basis for discrimination independently of racial categorization”); Lori L. Tharps, The Difference 
Between Racism and Colorism, TIME (Oct. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4512430/colorism-in-amer-
ica/.  But see Taunya Lovell Banks, Multilayered Racism: Courts’ Continued Resistance to Color-
ism Claims, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS, supra note 10, at 213, 222 
(arguing that colorism itself is a form of racism); infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 45.  See Baynes, supra note 9, at 133 (“A dark-skinned person of color is likely to encounter 
more discrimination than [their] light-skinned counterpart.” (footnote omitted)).  But see Jones, su-
pra note 9, at 1520 (“Colorism among Blacks does not operate uniformly in favor of persons with 
lighter skins.”).  The interaction of skin color and race discrimination can be complex.  For example, 
one study found that dark-skinned Black men perceived that they experienced more out-group dis-
crimination (by members of other racial groups) than light-skinned Black men; however, both dark-
skinned and light-skinned Black men perceived that they experienced more in-group discrimination 
(by other African Americans) than medium skin tone Black males.  See Ekeoma E. Uzogara et al., 
A Comparison of Skin Tone Discrimination Among African American Men: 1995 and 2003, 15 
PSYCHOL. OF MEN & MASCULINITY 201, 201 (2014). 
 46.  See ALICE WALKER, If the Present Looks Like the Past, What Does the Future Look Like?, 
in IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHER’S GARDENS 290, 290–91 (1983) (“Colorism—in my definition, [is] 
prejudicial or preferential treatment of same-race people based solely on their color . . . .”); see also 
Jones, supra note 9, at 1520. 
 47.  Jones, supra note 9, at 1498–99 (“It is important to note that colorism operates both intrar-
acially and interracially.  Intraracial colorism occurs when a member of one racial group makes a 
distinction based upon skin color between members of [their] own race. . . . Interracial colorism 
occurs when a member of one racial group makes a distinction based upon skin color between mem-
bers of another racial group.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 48.  See generally Sadat, supra note 43. 
 49.  See Vinay Harpalani, To Be White, Black, or Brown? South Asian Americans and the Race-
Color Distinction, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 609, 636 (2015) (highlighting the “inter-
section between racism and colorism”). 
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roots in differential treatment of Black slaves by White slave owners.50  Dur-
ing the era of slavery, White slave owners coerced enslaved Black women to 
engage in sexual relationships, resulting in mixed-race children.51  Several 
categories of mixed-race individuals were defined under law: mulatto (one-
half Black), quadroon (one-quarter Black), and octoroon (one-eighth 
Black).52  Professor Robert Reece notes that White people generally saw 
mixed-race slaves, who on average had lighter skin, as more intelligent and 
“more capable of being ‘civilized.’”53  He notes that slave owners were twice 
as likely to free mixed-race slaves as those slaves who were classified solely 
as Black,54 an assertion supported by other historical sources as well.55  
Among the enslaved, a color hierarchy also developed.  Generally, those 
with more White ancestry had lighter skin and were treated in a more privi-
leged fashion than their dark-skinned counterparts.56  Plantation owners 
sometimes conferred special favors to mixed-race slaves who were their own 
offspring.57  Mixed-race slaves could hold more prestigious positions, work-
ing within plantation owners’ houses rather than in the fields of plantations.58  
Sometimes they were able to acquire skills and learning, including literacy, 
and they could be hired out to work away from slave plantations.59  This gave 
lighter-skinned, mixed-race slaves more mobility around the plantation and 
                                                          
 50.  See generally Jones, supra note 9, at 1499–511.   
 51.  Id.   
 52.   Fegley et al., supra note 10, at 286.   
 53.  See Robert L. Reece, Genesis of U.S. Colorism and Skin Tone Stratification: Slavery, Free-
dom, and Mulatto-Black Occupational Inequality in the Late 19th Century, 45 REV. OF BLACK POL. 
ECON. 3, 8 (2018). 
 54.  Id. at 8.  Professor Reece reports that in 1860, forty-one percent of “free African Ameri-
cans” in the South were of mixed race, including seventy-six percent in the Deep South, and that 
only about ten percent of mixed-race individuals were enslaved.  Id. 
 55.  See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Color Differentiation in the American Systems of Slavery, 
3 J. OF INTERDISC. HIST. 509, 514 (1973) (noting that “[i]n the Southern United States, mulattoes 
comprised a large proportion of the so-called ‘free Negroes,’ and, in the eighteenth century, perhaps 
as many as half of all mulattoes were free.”).  Professor Horowitz further notes that “[m]ost of the 
Negroes who enjoyed any prosperity were mulattoes.”  Id.  Nevertheless, he qualifies this by stating 
that “[i]n several southern cities, propertied mulattoes were more common,” including Charleston, 
South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Mobile, Alabama; and New Orleans, Louisiana.  Id. at 514, 
514 n.20.  Although he acknowledges that mixed race individuals were a large proportion of free 
Black Americans, Professor Horowitz’s general view is that “by and large, through nearly all of the 
slavery period, free browns and blacks had the same generally low status.”  Id. at 514. 
 56.  See Ira Berlin, Time, Space, and the Evolution of Afro-American Society on British Main-
land North America, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 44, 64–65 (1980); Reece, supra note 53, at 8 (noting many 
privileges afforded to light-skinned, mixed-race slaves but not to dark-skinned slaves). 
 57.  See Berlin, supra note 56, at 53. 
 58.  Reece, supra note 53, at 8. 
 59.  Id. 
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off of it.60  Consequently, they had distinct advantages over dark-skinned 
monoracial Black Americans even when both were enslaved.61  
Professor Reece has empirically linked skin color inequalities after 
Emancipation to the social boundaries that were formed during slavery.62  Be-
cause they were much more likely to be free even before Emancipation and 
more likely to have acquired skills if they had been enslaved, mixed-race 
individuals were able to garner more wealth than monoracial Black Ameri-
cans.63  Professor Reece’s findings indicate that the antebellum color hierar-
chy, with relatively light-skinned mixed-race individuals at the top and rela-
tively dark-skinned monoracial Black Americans at the bottom, continued 
after slavery ended.64  Drawing upon U.S. Census data, his findings indicate 
that in 1880—shortly after Emancipation—the occupational status disparity 
between mixed-race individuals and monoracial Black Americans was 
greater in areas where slavery had been more prominent,65 and free mixed-
race individuals were more literate.66  Professor Reece also notes that after 
Emancipation, mixed-race individuals were more likely to marry other 
mixed-race individuals, thus compounding the wealth differences between 
light-skinned and dark-skinned Black Americans and further replicating the 
color stratification that existed during slavery.67 
All of these biases and inequities became a normalized component of 
Black communities.  Although all Black Americans were subjected to Jim 
Crow laws and other forms of oppression,68 both White and Black people 
                                                          
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See also Berlin, supra note 56, at 64–65 (“While one branch of black society [light-skinned 
people of color] stood so close to whites that its members sometimes disappeared into the white 
population, most plantation slaves [who were dark-skinned and monoracial] remained alienated 
from the world of their masters, physically and culturally.”).  But see Horowitz, supra note 55, at 
514 (“From time to time, the tendency of whites to differentiate mulattoes from Negroes manifested 
itself, but it never became dominant.” (footnote omitted)).   
 62.  Reece, supra note 53, at 9. 
 63.  Id. at 3 (noting that “skin color stratification was initiated at least in part by practices during 
chattel slavery”).  Professor Reece does acknowledge the need for more research on the transmission 
of light-skin privilege from slavery onwards.  Id. at 19. 
 64.  Id. at 17. 
 65.  Id. at 15 (“[C]ounties with higher historical proportions of slaves [prior to Emancipation] 
had, on average, higher Mulatto-Black occupational inequality [in 1880], with Mulattos advantaged 
relative to their Black counterparts.”). 
 66.  Id. at 17 (“Mulattos in counties where they could read and write in 1860 had, on average, 
higher occupational status in 1880.”). 
 67.  Id. at 18. 
 68.  See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896) (noting that Petitioner Homer Plessy 
“was seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored blood was 
not discernible in him” but still ruling that he had to ride railroad cars with only Black passengers); 
STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18, at 237 (defining “colored” as “includ[ing] not 
only Negroes but persons of mixed blood having any appreciable amount of Negro blood.” (citing 
Moreau v. Grandich, 75 So. 434 (1917))).  
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viewed people with lighter skin in a superior light.  During the Jim Crow Era, 
historically Black colleges and universities discriminated against dark-
skinned applicants, as did many other Black institutions.69  Elite social clubs 
such as the Blue Vein Society of Nashville, Tennessee, and the Bon Ton So-
ciety of Washington, D.C., also favored light-skinned Black Americans.70  
Skin color became a marker of social status within Black communities, and 
White Americans also continued to favor light-skinned Black Americans.71  
Although the Black Power Movement of the 1960s elevated pride among 
dark-skinned African Americans, colorism is still a prominent topic of dis-
cussion in Black communities.  Renowned film director Spike Lee’s movie, 
School Daze, dealt with colorism at a historically Black college.72  More re-
cently, an episode of the popular ABC sitcom, Black-ish, focused on skin 
color bias.73  Many other Black commentators have also examined these is-
sues.74 
                                                          
 69.  Fegley et al., supra note 10, at 286.   
 70.  Id.  Two tests to determine whether an individual’s skin was light enough were the “blue 
vein” test and the “paper bag” test.  Jones, supra note 9, at 1515–16.  Under the “blue vein” test, 
members had to have skin light enough so that the veins were visible in their arms.  Id. at 1515. For 
the “paper bag” text, skin had to be lighter than a brown paper bag.  Id. at 1515–16. 
 71.  See Taunya Lovell Banks, A Darker Shade of Pale Revisited: Disaggregated Blackness 
and Colorism in the “Post-Racial” Obama Era, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE 
MYTH OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 95, 101 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2014) (noting that Nobel 
laureate Gunnar Myrdal, “in his classic [1944] study of blacks in the United States, wrote: ‘without 
a doubt a Negro with light skin and other European features has in the North an advantage with 
white people when competing for jobs available to Negroes’” (quoting MYRDAL, supra note 39, at 
697)).  In 2010, journalists Mark Halperin and John Heilemann revealed that Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid had once privately stated that “[Barack] Obama, as a black candidate, could be success-
ful thanks, in part, to his ‘light-skinned’ appearance and speaking patterns.”  Mark Preston, Reid 
Apologizes for Racial Remarks About Obama During Campaign, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 9, 2010, 
11:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/09/obama.reid/index.html.  Although Reid 
apologized for these comments, many Black Americans found truth in his sentiments.  See Jake 
Tapper & Karen Travers, Reid's Racial Remark: Some Truth to It?, ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010, 5:38 
PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/senator-harry-reids-racial-remarks-truth-studies-crit-
ics/story?id=9535416 (“Many prominent African Americans … said [Reid’s] observation was 
true—that Americans in general find lighter-skinned African Americans more socially acceptable 
than those with darker skin, especially if they speak eloquently.”). 
 72.  SCHOOL DAZE (Columbia Pictures & 40 Acres & A Mule Filmworks 1988).  
 73.  Black-ish: Black Like Us (ABC television broadcast Jan. 15, 2019); see Sydney Scott, 
“Black-ish” Poignantly Tackled Colorism with an Honest Family Conversation, ESSENCE (Jan. 16, 
2019), https://www.essence.com/entertainment/black-ish-colorism-episode/.   
 74.  See, e.g., DARK GIRLS (Urban Winter Entertainment & Duke Media 2011).  Some com-
mentators have discussed colorism in casting and portrayal of Black actors.  See, e.g., Tiffany 
Onyejiaka, Hollywood’s Colorism Problem Can’t Be Ignored Any Longer, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 22, 
2017), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/hollywoods-colorism-problem-cant-be-ignored; Tysheira 
Scribner, A Look at 90s TV and Colorism, BLACK 90S (Apr. 30, 2018), http://theblack90s.com/un-
categorized/a-look-at-90s-tv-and-colorism/.  There are also examples of Black artists whose work 
has implicitly critiqued colorism within Black communities.  See Jamilah King, J. Cole Talks About 
Colorism in Hip-Hop and the White House, COLORLINES (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:12 PM), 
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/j-cole-talks-about-colorism-hip-hop-and-white-house.   
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Beyond African-American communities, there has been increased atten-
tion to colorism within other groups, including Latinx,75 Asian Americans,76 
South Asian Americans,77 Native Americans,78 and biracial and multiracial 
Americans.79  On a global scale, commentators have analyzed skin color bi-
ases in Latin America,80 Africa,81 Asia,82 and South Asia.83  Additionally, 
international human rights activists have begun to address colorism.84 
Despite this growing awareness, there are challenges to addressing dis-
parities based on skin color.  Colorism is difficult to track empirically be-
cause unlike formal racial categories,85 there are no government data which 
                                                          
Sometimes critiques of colorism have been controversial: for example, when they affirmed the 
beauty of dark-skinned Black women but also belittled light-skinned Black women.  See, e.g., Del 
tha Funky Homosapien, Dark Skin Girls, on I WISH MY BROTHER GEORGE WAS HERE (Elektra 
Records 1991) (stating that “[l]ight skin girls lack the dark skin quality” and “[d]ark skin girls are 
better than light skin”).  For lyrics to Dark Skin Girls see Dark Skin Girls, GENIUS, https://ge-
nius.com/8928001 (last visited May 6, 2020); see also Preezy, Del Tha Funky Homosapiens Offbeat 
Debut Helped Shape West Coast Alt-Rap, BOOMBOX (Oct. 25, 2016), https://theboombox.com/del-
tha-funky-homosapiens-offbeat-debut-helped-shape-west-coast-alt-rap/ (noting that Dark Skin 
Girls was “abrasive” and “would clearly be called out for misogyny and colorism [against light-
skinned Black women] today.”). 
 75.  See Tanya Katerí Hernández, Latinos at Work: When Color Discrimination Involves More 
Than Color, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS, supra note 10, at 236. 
 76.  See Kimberly D. Chanbonpin, Between Black and White: The Coloring of Asian Ameri-
cans, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 637 (2015). 
 77.  See Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism Among South Asians: Title VII and Skin Tone Dis-
crimination, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 665 (2015); Harpalani, supra note 49, at 610, 
635. 
 78.  See Donna Brown, Karen Branden & Ronald E. Hall, Native American Colorism: From 
Historical Manifestations to the Current Era, 62 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 2023 (2018). 
 79.  See Keshia L. Harris, Biracial American Colorism: Passing for White, 62 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 2072 (2018). 
 80.  See Tanya Katerí Hernández, Colorism and the Law in Latin America—Global Perspec-
tives on Colorism Conference Remarks, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 683 (2015). 
 81.  See Pumza Fihlani, Africa: Where Black Is Not Really Beautiful, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20444798.  
 82.  See Debito Arudou, Japan’s Under-Researched Visible Minorities: Applying Critical Race 
Theory to Racialization Dynamics in a Non-White Society, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
695 (2015). 
 83.  See Neha Mishra, India and Colorism: The Finer Nuances, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. 
L. REV. 725 (2015). 
 84.  See William J. Aceves, Two Stories About Skin Color and International Human Rights 
Advocacy, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 563 (2015); Stephanie Farrior, “Color” in the Non-
Discrimination Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Two Covenants, 
14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 751 (2015). 
 85.  See Vinay Harpalani, DesiCrit: Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of South Asian Ameri-
cans, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 77, 111 (2013) (defining “formal racialization” as “the 
creation and application of official racial classification schemes by the government or another 
source of authority”); see id. at 135–36 (noting how U.S. Census racial classification of Asian Indian 
Americans changed from “Non-White/Hindu” in 1960 to “White” in 1970 to “Asian Indian” in 
1980). 
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classify individuals based on their skin color.86  There have been social sci-
ence studies collecting and analyzing data that provide illustrations of color-
ism.  For example, Professors Michael Hughes and Bradley Hertel report that 
even after controlling for gender, age, and parental socioeconomic status, 
light-skinned African Americans complete more years of education than 
dark-skinned African Americans.87  Professor Amelia Branigan and her col-
leagues come to a similar conclusion.88  A study by Professors Arthur Gold-
smith, Darrick Hamilton, and William Darity finds that employers prefer 
light-skinned African-American employees over those with dark skin,89 and 
Professors Verna Keith and Cedric Herring find that light-skinned African 
Americans had personal income that was sixty-five percent higher than dark-
skinned African Americans.90  Other studies, in a variety of areas,91 have also 
                                                          
 86.  See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, We Are All Americans!: The Latin Americanization of Racial 
Stratification in the USA, 5 RACE & SOC’Y 3, 5 (2002) (“[T]here is no data set that includes sys-
tematic data on the skin tone of all Americans . . . .”). 
 87.  Michael Hughes & Bradley R. Hertel, The Significance of Color Remains: A Study of Life 
Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic Consciousness Among Black Americans, 68 SOC. FORCES 
1105, 1109 (1990).   
 88.  See Amelia R. Branigan et al., Skin Color, Sex, and Educational Attainment in the Post-
Civil Rights Era, 42 SOC. SCI. RES. 1659, 1659 (2013) [hereinafter Branigan et al., Skin Color, Sex, 
and Educational Attainment] (finding that “[f]or Black men and women . . . increase in skin light-
ness . . . [is] associated with . . . increase in educational attainment.”).  But see Aaron Gullickson, 
The Significance of Color Declines: A Re-Analysis of Skin Tone Differentials in Post-Civil Rights 
America, 84 SOC. FORCES 157, 172–73 (2006) (“Beginning with cohorts born in the 1940s, skin 
tone differences in educational and occupational attainment which have traditionally privileged 
lighter-skinned blacks declined significantly.  The decline was so dramatic that skin tone does not 
appear to have been relevant at all for cohorts born . . . [by] 1963.”).  Another study by Branigan et 
al. suggests there may be a gender difference for the relationship between skin color and educational 
attainment.  See Amelia R. Branigan et al., The Shifting Salience of Skin Color for Educational 
Attainment, 5 SOCIUS 1, 1 (2019) [hereinafter Branigan et al., Shifting Salience of Skin Color] (find-
ing that there is “a large and statistically significant decline in the association between skin color 
and educational attainment between baby boomer and millennial black women, whereas the decline 
in this association between the two cohorts of black men is smaller and nonsignificant”).  The au-
thors note that the “results emphasize the need to conceptualize colorism as an intersectional prob-
lem and suggest caution when generalizing evidence of colorism in earlier cohorts to young adults 
today.”  Id. 
 89.  Arthur H. Goldsmith, Darrick Hamilton & William Darity, Jr., Shades of Discrimination: 
Skin Tone and Wages, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 242, 245 (2006) (finding “[e]mployers . . . display a 
preference for light-skinned [African Americans]” over those with darker skin). 
 90.  Verna M. Keith & Cedric Herring, Skin Tone and Stratification in the Black Community, 
97 AM. J. SOC. 760, 769 (1991).  Another study found that “protective effects of economic success 
are not as prevalent among darker-skinned African Americans as they are among those with lighter 
skin.”  Elizabeth Sweet et al., Relationships Between Skin Color, Income, and Blood Pressure 
Among African Americans in the CARDIA Study, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2253, 2256 (2007). 
 91.  See, e.g., Jennifer L. Hochschild & Vesla Weaver, The Skin Color Paradox and the Amer-
ican Racial Order, 86 SOC. FORCES 643, 643 (2007) (“Dark-skinned [B]lacks in the United States 
have lower socioeconomic status, more punitive relationships with the criminal justice system, di-
minished prestige, and less likelihood of holding elective office compared with their lighter coun-
terparts.”); Jessica M. Kizer, Arrested by Skin Color: Evidence from Siblings and a Nationally Rep-
resentative Sample, 3 SOCIUS 1, 1 (2017) (“[H]aving darker skin remains a significant predictor for 
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illustrated that colorism, like racism, is still a powerful force in American and 
global society. 
C.  Racism or Colorism? 
In the course of American civil rights law, “color” discrimination has 
had two different meanings: It can be the manifestation of either racism or 
colorism.  Historically, the law has sometimes treated “race” and “color” as 
synonymous, thus equating color discrimination with race discrimination.92  
But at other times, the law has differentiated between race and color and thus 
separated colorism from racism.93 
Scholarly discourse on color discrimination also reflects this type of di-
chotomy.  Professor Taunya Lovell Banks emphasizes the role of skin color 
in how individuals experience race, and in “how race-related discrimination 
is manifested.” 94  Professor Banks argues that colorism itself is one of “the 
varied faces of racism”95 and that skin color discrimination should be treated 
as a form of race discrimination.96  Conversely, Professor Trina Jones 
acknowledges that skin color is often used to indicate race, but she cautions 
against “confus[ing] the indicator with the thing that it is indicating.”97  Pro-
fessor Jones argues that “[w]ith colorism, skin color does not serve as an in-
dicator of race. . . . it is the social meaning afforded skin color itself that re-
sults in the differential treatment.”98 
This duality in the meaning of “color” is an overarching theme for a 
historical survey of color-based anti-discrimination law and for its potential 
future applications.  The next Part examines the ambiguous legal understand-
ings of color in early American history.  This paves the way to analyze the 
evolution of color discrimination in American civil rights law. 
                                                          
being arrested.”); Ellis P. Monk, The Color of Punishment: African Americans, Skin Tone, and the 
Criminal Justice System, 42 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1593 (2018) (“[A]mong African Ameri-
cans[] . . . [darker] skin tone is significantly associated with the probability of having been arrested 
and/or incarcerated, net of relevant controls.”); Ellis P. Monk, Jr., The Cost of Skin Color: Skin 
Color, Discrimination, and Health Among African Americans, 121 AM. J. SOC. 396, 396 (2015) 
[hereinafter Monk, Cost of Skin Color] (“Intraracial health differences related to skin tone (and 
discrimination) often rival or even exceed disparities between blacks and whites as a whole.”).  But 
see Amelia R. Branigan et al., Complicating Colorism: Race, Skin Color, and the Likelihood of 
Arrest, 3 SOCIUS 1, 1 (2017) (“[B]lack men’s probability of arrest remains constant across the spec-
trum of skin color . . . .”).  Ironically, Branigan et al. found that among White males, arrest proba-
bility did increase with darker skin.  Id. 
 92.  See infra notes 338, 373–374 and accompanying text; infra Part III.D.3. 
 93.  See infra note 390 and accompanying text; infra Parts V.A. and V.C. 
 94.  Banks, supra note 44, at 222.   
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 216. 
 97.  Trina Jones, The Case for Legal Recognition of Colorism Claims, in SHADES OF 
DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS, supra note 10, at 223, 225. 
 98.  Id. at 225.  
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II.  COLOR OF LAW 
Dating back to early American history, the term “color,” along with 
other color terminology, has sometimes denoted race and at other times re-
ferred to skin color.  Whiteness was historically a prerequisite for citizenship 
rights in the United States, both at the federal and the state levels.  Under the 
Naturalization Law of 1790, Congress restricted federal citizenship to “free, 
white person[s],”99  and the meaning of “white person” under this statute was 
litigated in federal courts.100  In state courts, definitions of Whiteness and 
Blackness were also litigated.  Blackness could confer slave status, and ante-
bellum cases in Southern states confronted the dilemma of determining 
race.101  Skin color played a role in these cases,102 which provided a backdrop 
to Reconstruction Era anti-discrimination laws protecting against race and 
color discrimination. 
A.  Constructing Color 
During the antebellum era, between the late 18th century and the Civil 
War, the relationship between race and color became part of the law of slav-
ery.  Skin color could not only denote hierarchy among slaves,103 but could 
itself confer status as a free person or a slave. 
Professor Ariela Gross analyzes several cases where slaves sued for 
their freedom on the ground that they were not Black.104  Professor Gross 
notes that common law in Southern states had “established a presumption of 
freedom for persons of white appearance and of slavery for persons of black 
appearance.”105  For example, in the Arkansas case of Daniel v. Guy,106 the 
                                                          
 99.  Naturalization Law of 1790, ch. 3, 103, 103–04 (repealed 1795).   
 100.  See IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 49–77 
(1996).  These “racial prerequisite” cases occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries.  Id. at 49.  Skin color did not play a significant role in most of these cases.  Between 1878 and 
1944, federal courts heard fifty-one “racial prerequisite” cases.  Id.  In only one of these cases was 
skin color a determining factor.  See United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1910) (holding 
that Petitioner Abba Dolla was White because the “skin of [Dolla’s] arm . . . was sufficiently trans-
parent for the blue color of the veins to show very clearly”). 
Reconstruction Era legal enactments granted citizenship to African Americans, thus creating 
another potential venue for naturalization.  Haney López, supra note 38.  There was one case liti-
gated under the 1790 Act where the Petitioner, a Mexican American, argued his Blackness conferred 
citizenship.  See In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). 
 101.  Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-
Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998). 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  See supra note 56. 
 104.  Gross, supra note 101. 
 105.  Id. at 122 n.33 (emphasis omitted). 
 106.  19 Ark. 121 (1857). 
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court noted, “Where a person held as a slave, sues for freedom, and it mani-
festly appears that he belongs to the negro race . . . he is presumed to be a 
slave . . . .”107 
However, two factors complicated these presumptions.108  First, as 
mixed racial ancestry became more common, appearance was sometimes too 
ambiguous to determine race.109  Second, Native Americans could also have 
dark skin, and establishing Native American ancestry could negate slave sta-
tus.110  Consequently, racial identity became legally contested.111 
Courts highlighted the importance of skin color in determining a per-
son’s race, although they noted that factors such as ancestry and reputation 
also mattered.  In the South Carolina case of State v. Scott,112 the court 
opined: 
[A]lthough colour would in general be a safe guide in determining 
the genealogy . . . it is not an infallible criterion . . . . When the col-
our is distinctly marked, that of itself would furnish a presumption 
of the class to which the individual belonged.  In a doubtful case, 
common reputation, which is always admissible in the deduction 
of pedigree, would serve as a guide.  But these, as mere presump-
tions, must yield to positive proof . . . .113 
Similarly, in State v. Davis,114 also in South Carolina, the court stated race 
determination was a factual question for juries, based on “inspection as to 
colour . . . peculiar negro features . . . reputation as to parentage; and . . . ev-
idence . . . of the person’s having been received in society, and exercised the 
privileges of a white man.”115 
                                                          
 107.  Id. at 134 (emphasis omitted); see also State v. Whitaker, 3 Del. (1 Harr.) 549, 550 (1840) 
(referring to “color” as “badge of [slave] status”). 
 108.  Gross, supra note 101, at 122. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id.  In Hudgins v. Wright, a family in Virginia sued for freedom on grounds of their Native 
American ancestry.  1 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 140 (1806) (holding that plaintiffs were free because 
of their straight hair).  For more on Hudgins, see Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 37. 
 111.  See generally Paul Finkleman, Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063, 2108–09 (1993) 
(“[D]uring the Revolutionary and early post-Revolutionary period race definition . . . [was] a rela-
tively easy task—physical appearance or ancestry would suffice.  This would soon change.”); Gross, 
supra note 101. 
 112.  17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 270 (1829). 
 113.  Id. at 273; see also Daniel, 19 Ark. at 134 (“Where a person held as a slave, sues for free-
dom, and it manifestly appears that he belongs to the negro race, whether of full or mixed blood, he 
is presumed to be a slave, that being the condition generally of such people in this State.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 114.  18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 558 (1832). 
 115.  Id. at 560.  Similarly, in Thurman v. State, the court noted that “[a] mulatto is to be known, 
not solely by color, kinky hair, or slight admixture of negro blood, or by a greater admixture of it 
not amounting to one-half, but by reputation, by his reception into society, and by the exercise of 
certain privileges.”  18 Ala. 276, 277 (1850). 
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The role of skin color in these complex definitions of race varied by 
locality.  States had their own different criteria for determining a person’s 
race, and legal definitions and common understandings of race varied signif-
icantly.116  In the Ohio case of Gray v. State,117 the court used skin color alone 
to simplify the definition: “We are unable to set out any other plain and ob-
vious line or mark between the different races.  Color alone is sufficient.”118 
The relationship between skin color and legal definitions of race was 
also changing over time.  Ohio itself illustrated this: Professor Daniel Sharf-
stein notes that at the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1850-51, one dele-
gate stated that “treatment of the negro” was based on “the color of his skin” 
and “by ‘color’ in these discussions we do not mean color at all. . . . you must 
get his genealogy . . . he must stand condemned as a person of ‘color’ . . . the 
mixture never runs out. . . . Ten or ten thousand times diluted by mixtures 
with the Caucasian race, and it is still the same.”119  According to Professor 
Sharfstein, “[i]n Ohio, blood was eclipsing skin color” as the defining feature 
of race.120  
At the same time, the 1850 U.S. Census collected demographic infor-
mation about “color,” not “race.”121  Moreover, Census color categories in-
cluded terms such as “Mulatto,”122 which speak to ancestry rather than skin 
color.  In some contexts, race and color were the same; in other contexts, they 
were different; and at times, it was not easy to tell whether they were the 
same or different.  Against this historical backdrop, the Reconstruction Era 
Framers had to grapple with drafting anti-discrimination laws—laws that 
came to include both “race” and “color” in their enacted text. 
B.  Reconstructing Color 
In the aftermath of the Civil War and Emancipation, the key goal of 
Reconstruction laws was to secure citizenship rights for African Americans.  
The Reconstruction Era first saw the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment 
                                                          
 116.  See Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop 
Rule, 1600–1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592, 604 (2007) (“Depending on the state, anyone with at least 
one-quarter, one-eighth, or one-sixteenth ‘black blood’ was legally black.”).  See generally STATES’ 
LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18. 
 117.  4 Ohio 353 (1831). 
 118.  Id. at 355. 
 119.  Sharfstein, supra note 116, at 649 (emphasis omitted) (citing FRANK U. QUILLIN, THE 
COLOR LINE IN OHIO: A HISTORY OF RACE PREJUDICE IN A TYPICAL NORTHERN STATE 87 (1913)).  
 120.  Id.; see also id. at 652 (“Color is becoming every day less and less a test by which to 
determine the fact of human chattelship.” (quoting White Slaves, PHILANTHROPIST, Nov. 12, 1839, 
at 3)); id. at 647 (“It is not the shade of color, but the purity of the blood, which determines the stock 
or race to which the individual belongs.” (quoting Thacker v. Hawk, 11 Ohio 376, 380 (1842) (Read, 
J., dissenting))). 
 121.  1850, supra note 25.   
 122.  Id. 
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to abolish slavery.123  Subsequently, to grant citizenship rights to African 
Americans, three major laws were enacted: (1) The Civil Rights Act of 
1866,124 which was the first civil rights law to include the terms “race” and 
“color”; (2) The Fourteenth Amendment,125 which contained the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and was widely understood as an effort to constitutionalize the 
1866 Act;126 and (3) The Fifteenth Amendment,127 which is the only provi-
sion in the U.S. Constitution to include the terms “race” and “color.”  The 
text of both the 1866 Act and the Fifteenth Amendment suggests that “race” 
and “color” have different meanings, lest this text violate the rule against 
surplusage.128  But what are those different meanings, and how did the Fram-
                                                          
 123.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  For more on the history of the Thirteenth Amendment, see Wil-
liam M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents 
of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311 (2007); Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951). 
 124.  Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).   
 125.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 126.  See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE 
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 115 (1988) (“[S]ection one [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was understood 
to remove all doubts about the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act . . . .”).  During floor 
debate on the Act, Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania questioned whether the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 would be constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, which he read narrowly to abol-
ish slavery and nothing more:  
As I understand the chairman of Committee on the Judiciary, he takes his ground upon 
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States recently passed. . . .  [N]obody 
can pretend, nobody can believe that it was intended by [the first clause of the Thirteenth 
Amendment] of the Constitution to confer . . . such authority [to pass the provisions of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866]. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866).   
 127.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 128.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that 
any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction 
is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”).  Marbury suggests that words in the Constitution 
cannot be interpreted as “mere surplusage . . . entirely without meaning.”  Id.  See also Hibbs v. 
Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .” (quoting 
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 181–86 (rev. 6th 
ed. 2000))); United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 497 (1997) (“Absent a clearly expressed legisla-
tive intention to the contrary, [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” (quot-
ing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))); Walker v. 
Sec’y of the Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403, 406 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (“[T]he statutes and case law repeat-
edly and distinctly refer to race and color.  This court is left with no choice but to conclude, when 
Congress and the Supreme Court refer to race and color in the same phrase, that ‘race’ is to mean 
‘race’, and ‘color’ is to mean ‘color’.  To hold otherwise would mean that Congress and the Supreme 
Court have either mistakenly or purposefully overlooked an obvious redundancy.” (emphasis omit-
ted)); see also infra note 390. 
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ers of these Reconstruction laws come to include both terms?  The congres-
sional debates over Reconstruction laws provide some insight into these 
questions.129 
1.  Civil Rights Act of 1866 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, in its original version, was the first Re-
construction law to include “race” and “color” in its text.130  The Act was 
deemed to be “[a]n Act to protect all [p]ersons in the United States in their 
[c]ivil [r]ights, and furnish the [m]eans of their [v]indication.”131  Congress 
passed the Act over President Andrew Johnson’s veto, approximately one 
year after the Civil War ended.  Section 1 of the Act states: 
[A]ll persons born in the United States . . . excluding Indians not 
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and 
such citizens, of every race and color . . . shall have the same 
right . . . to [various facets of citizenship, property rights, and equal 
protection] . . . as is enjoyed by [W]hite [persons] . . . .132 
Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also gave legal effect to both race 
and color through criminal law: It deemed that that any person who caused 
any of the rights protected by the Act to be deprived on account of “color or 
race” would be guilty of a misdemeanor.133 
In the congressional floor debate on the 1866 Act, Senator Edgar Cowan 
specifically noted the ambiguity of each term: 
[T]ell me what is meant by the word “race,” and where it is settled 
that there are two races of men, and if it is settled that there are two 
or more, how many.  Where is the line to be drawn?  What consti-
tute the distinctive characteristics and marks which limit and bound 
these races? . . . “[C]olor” is another word upon which nobody is 
very well advised just at present.  Men are of all shades of color, 
                                                          
 129.  See ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES 121–29, 131–34, 
136–41 (1967).   
 130.  Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).  After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was reenacted as the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 318–319.  The 1870 Act did not contain the words “race” or “color.”  See 
infra text accompanying notes 318–319.  However, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 subsequently did 
refer to “citizens of every race and color.” Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875).  
 131.  Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).   
 132.  Id. (emphasis added).  Apparently, the first draft of the bill had included the word “cover” 
rather than “color.”  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 212 (1866) (Illinois Senator Lyman 
Trumbull, sponsor of Civil Rights Act of 1866, noting that “the first amendment of the Committee 
on the Judiciary was . . . to strike out the word ‘cover’ and to insert the word ‘color.’”).  Presumably, 
this was just a typographical error. 
 133.   Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).   
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and the races of men differ from the deepest jet up to the fairest of 
lily white all over the world.134 
Senator Cowen seemed to view “race” as a particular group of humans and 
“color” as their skin color.  Interestingly, to further support his point, Senator 
Cowan also referred to potential discrimination on the basis of hair texture: 
If a [s]tate did not desire to make a distinction on account of race, 
I suppose it might lawfully make a distinction on account of hair.  
If it desired to single out any class of its citizens and subject them 
to special laws, it would be a good description, and would not be 
obnoxious to the terms of this bill, if it were to say that it should 
apply to all persons whose hair was ribbon-shaped and curled nat-
urally, and not to persons whose hair was cylindriform.135 
While both skin color and hair are used to identify race, “color” was deemed 
important enough to include in the text of the Act.  This was likely because 
skin color was the visible feature that was most closely associated with race, 
and perhaps also because the term “color” had often been used as a synonym 
for race.136 
In other floor statements, color and race seemed to be interchangeable.  
“Color” could have been a synonym for race, or it could have denoted skin 
color as a defining feature of race.  For example, Senator Garrett Davis stated 
that “one short bill breaks down all the domestic systems of law . . . so far 
not only as the negro, but as any man without regard to color is concerned.”137  
“Negro” is typically used as a racial term, but at that time, some formal clas-
sifications of color, such as those in the U.S. Census, used racial terms.138  
Senator Davis may have also viewed color as skin color: not race per se but 
a defining physical feature of African Americans.  Either way, color here was 
not separable from race. 
Similarly, Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland interpreted the Act to 
mean “that no [s]tate shall discriminate . . . between any inhabitants . . . on 
                                                          
 134.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866).   
 135.  Id.  Senator Cowan’s statement here is reminiscent of Hudgins v. Wright, where the court 
believed that hair texture was even more indicative of race than skin color.  See supra note 110.  
Recently, several states have banned discrimination based on hairstyles and texture.  See Ovetta 
Wiggins, States Are Banning Discrimination Against Black Hairstyles. For Some Lawmakers, It’s 
Personal., WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2020, 7:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-pol-
itics/maryland-bill-crown-act-hairstyles-discrimination/2020/03/12/c3b81582-5f05-11ea-b014-
4fafa866bb81_story.html.  For more on hair-related race discrimination generally, see Paulette M. 
Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 40 DUKE L.J. 365 
(1991); D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to 
Do With It, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1356 (2008); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Ex-
ploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010).  
 136.  See supra Section I.A. 
 137.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 598 (1866).   
 138.  See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text. 
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account of any race to which they may belong, whether white or black, on 
account of color, if they are not white.”139  Senator Johnson here seems to 
denote color as a defining feature of race, but it is not clear whether the term 
refers specifically to skin color or to race itself.  Again, color is not separable 
from race. 
Throughout their discussions, the Framers of the 1866 Act typically 
used the term “white person” to denote those people who already had full 
citizenship rights.  In contrast, they used a variety of terms to refer to African 
Americans: “negro,” “black man,” “colored person,” “person of color,” and 
“persons of African descent,” along with a few references to “mulatto.”140  
These different terms may have reflected various understandings of race, in-
cluding the belief that skin color was often, even if not always, the defining 
feature of race. 
2.  Reconstruction Amendments 
After the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, the Fourteenth 
Amendment enacted the broadest constitutional protections of citizenship 
rights.141  Although the Fourteenth Amendment did not contain the words 
“race” or “color,” it is widely understood as an endeavor to constitutionalize 
the 1866 Act.142  Eventually, the Equal Protection Clause became the primary 
vehicle in the Constitution to protect against these forms of discrimination. 
The congressional debate on the Fourteenth Amendment shows that it 
was intended to protect Black Americans against race and color discrimina-
tion.  In the debate, there was still ambiguity around the meaning of “color”; 
however, statements made during the floor debate illustrated the purpose of 
the Equal Protection Clause.  Pennsylvania Representative and Radical Re-
publican Thaddeus Stevens highlighted some of the protections the Clause 
would provide: 
                                                          
 139.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866).   
 140.  See generally id. 
 141.  The Equal Protection Clause became the primary means to protect against race and color 
discrimination.  Additionally, section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the Citizenship 
Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Due Process Clause.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 142.  See NELSON, supra note 126.  Opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment questioned its 
necessity in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and they feared it would allow interracial marriage.  
See id.  Proponents of the Amendment argued that since legislation could be repealed, a constitu-
tional amendment would provide more stable protection of Black people’s rights and would put to 
rest any doubt about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Id.  The latter view 
prevailed as the Amendment was ratified in 1868.  Id. 
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Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the 
black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree.  
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford “equal” protec-
tion to the black man. . . . Whatever law allows the white man to 
testify in court shall allow the man of color to do the same. . . . 
Now different degrees of punishment are inflicted, not on account 
of the magnitude of the crime, but according to the color of the 
skin.  Now color disqualifies a man from testifying in courts, or 
being tried in the same way as white men.143 
Representative Stevens appears to view “color of the skin” as a defining 
feature of race.  Other comments in the floor debate also illustrated the over-
lap between race and color and the ambiguous use of color-based terminol-
ogy.  Comments by New Jersey Representative A. J. Rogers, who opposed 
the Fourteenth Amendment on grounds that it would allow interracial mar-
riage, showed how common understandings of race fused notions of ancestry, 
color, and purity: 
A white citizen of any State may marry a white woman; but if a 
black citizen goes into the same State he is entitled to the same 
privileges and immunities that white citizens have, and therefore 
under this amendment a negro might be allowed to marry a white 
woman.  I will not go for an amendment of the Constitution to give 
a power so dangerous . . . as to run the pure white blood of the An-
glo-Saxon people of the country into the black blood of the negro 
or the copper blood of the Indian.144  
Here, Representative Rogers used color terminology metaphorically to refer 
to racial ancestry—“black blood” and “copper blood.” 
Debate over language in the Fifteenth Amendment, which sought to pro-
tect the right to vote, can also shed light on the meaning of “color” in the 
Reconstruction laws.  The Fifteenth Amendment is the only provision in the 
U.S. Constitution that contains the terms “race” and “color.”145  Section 1 of 
the Amendment reads: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”146 
Congressional floor debate about the Fifteenth Amendment contained 
nuanced discussion of specific terms.  For example, Michigan Senator Jacob 
                                                          
 143.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).   
 144.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 134 (1866).   
 145.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 146.  Id. (emphasis added).  A strict textualist analysis of the Fifteenth Amendment suggests not 
only that “race” and “color” have different meanings, but that this presumption is even stronger than 
for the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  The Fifteenth Amendment states “race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude.”  Id.  The word “or” implies that all three are separate.  Taken in historical context, 
such a presumption could extend to other Reconstruction Era laws: if “color” is different from “race” 
for the Fifteenth Amendment, then it should be different for other laws as well.   
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Howard offered an amendment to the language to protect voting rights spe-
cifically for “citizens of African descent.”  When asked to clarify what this 
meant, he noted: 
I mean by African descent what is popularly known as such. . . . 
By one of “African descent” is understood a person who has Afri-
can blood in his veins. . . .  It designates what is commonly known 
as the negro, or some person having colored blood in his veins to 
the amount of at least one eighth.  I believe it is settled by the courts 
of justice that when the quantity becomes less than one eighth, in 
law and in jurisprudence he is called a white man.147 
Representative John Bingham of Ohio, a Radical Republican, wanted to 
add the terms “nativity,” “property,” and “creed” to the amendment because 
some states, such as Rhode Island, discriminated on these bases.148  Bingham 
agreed with the terms “race,” “color,” and “previous condition of servitude,” 
and noted that Ohio and twenty other states had constitutions which “unjustly 
and wrongfully discriminate among citizens on account of color.”149  Bing-
ham’s remarks indicate that he had reached an understanding of the protec-
tions conferred by including “race,” “color,” and “nativity.”  They also illus-
trate the level of nuance that went into determining the specific terms in the 
Reconstruction laws.  But it is still not clear that Bingham or others viewed 
color as a characteristic that was separable from race. 
As with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, debate over the Reconstruction 
Amendments saw White people referred to as just as “white men” or “white 
women,” while various terms were used to denote Black Americans: “negro,” 
“black,” and others.  Whiteness was the privileged status, and Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment aimed to extend the privileges of citizenship to 
those who, on the basis of race or color, were deemed to be non-White.  And 
while the Reconstruction Framers were clear about this aim, they were varied 
in their understanding about the relationship between race and color. 
C.  Why Both “Race” and “Color”? 
The Reconstruction Framers vigorously debated the wording of civil 
rights laws, considering which rights and classes needed enumerated protec-
tion.  Some of their comments indicate that they equated race with ances-
try.150  They may have also viewed skin color separately from race, though 
perhaps still as the defining feature of race.151  Nevertheless, in their debates, 
                                                          
 147.  CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1009 (1869).   
 148.  Id. at 1426–27.   
 149.  Id. at 1427. 
 150.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 147. 
 151.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 139, 144. 
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they often used the terms “race” and “color” interchangeably.152  Ultimately, 
the Framers of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fifteenth Amend-
ment determined that “race” and “color” were two terms that were important 
enough to include.  But if the terms were essentially used interchangeably, 
why include both of them?  What did the “color” provision offer that the 
“race” provision could not? 
The floor debates do not provide a conclusive answer.  But in the ante-
bellum period, skin color often served as a proxy for race when evidence of 
ancestry was not available.153  Many different understandings (and misunder-
standings) of race emerged, reflected by the plethora of terms used by the 
Reconstruction Framers to describe Black Americans—such as “black,” 
“person of color,” “negro,” “African,” and “mulatto.”  In contrast, the Fram-
ers only used “White” (or “white person” or “white man”) to describe White 
Americans.  Whiteness was a singular, privileged status.154 
The various terms used to refer to Black Americans could emphasize 
ancestry or skin color.  In the collective minds of the Reconstruction Framers, 
the language of “race” and “color” together may have captured the different 
ways to distinguish between “white persons” and others.  For example, race 
may have focused on ancestry155 and color on skin color.156  Some of the 
Framers may have distinguished between race and color,157 but many seemed 
to treat race and color as essentially the same.158 
Even those who understood that race and color were not the same could 
use skin color as presumptive of race.  Because skin color can be easily iden-
tified visually, it can become the basis for race discrimination.  Race discrim-
ination, based on visual perception of skin color, could then occur against a 
                                                          
 152.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 139, 144. 
 153.  See Jones, supra note 9, at 1502–03 n.50 (noting that “[ancestry] information was not al-
ways available, given that accurate records were not kept and given the pervasive division of slave 
families throughout the period of slavery”). 
 154.  See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.  It may be noteworthy that in later litiga-
tion around the meaning of Whiteness, ancestry of the Petitioners was generally known, and the 
issue was whether particular ethnic groups were considered “White.”  See supra notes 99–100 and 
accompanying text.  Conversely, when courts determined Blackness and slave status, they had to 
make assumptions about individuals’ ancestry—based in part on skin color.  See supra text accom-
panying notes 101–118. 
 155.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 147. 
 156.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 143. 
 157.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 134, 143. 
 158.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 137, 139, 144. 
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racially ambiguous person who appeared to be non-White, even if that per-
son’s ancestry was unknown or contested.159  “Color” provisions may have 
captured this form of race discrimination.160 
The purpose of Reconstruction Era color protections was not to address 
within-group discrimination by skin color, or discrimination by White Amer-
icans specifically against a racial subclass such as dark-skinned African 
Americans.  Rather, the Reconstruction Framers were concerned with dis-
crimination against all “persons of color.”  Some of the Framers may have 
viewed “color” as distinct from “race,” but they did not view color discrimi-
nation as having a distinct target from race discrimination.  Both forms of 
discrimination targeted all African Americans.  As the next Part illustrates, 
this was also reflected in the Supreme Court’s initial rulings on the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
III.  COLOR-CONSCIOUS 
In early Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States Su-
preme Court considered the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Due Process 
Clause, and Equal Protection Clause together.161  The Slaughterhouse Cas-
es162 limited the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to those privileges or immunities linked to federal citizenship, not state 
                                                          
 159.  See supra Part II.A.  In fact, light-skinned African Americans were more likely to be ra-
cially ambiguous, although they were still darker than most White people. 
 160.  Dr. Paul Finkelman, eminent legal historian and current president of Gratz College, gave a 
similar explanation for including both “race” and “color” in the text of the Fifteenth Amendment.  
Dr. Finkelman notes two reasons: 1. “Race” in the Reconstruction Era often denoted national origin 
or ethnicity (e.g., “German race,” “Chinese race,” “Jewish race”); 2. The Reconstruction Framers 
realized that Southern states could claim that skin color discrimination was different than race dis-
crimination and thus allowable.  See Paul Finkelman, President, Gratz College, Clark v. Muscatine 
Schools and the Historic Civil Rights Decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court, Clark 150 Conference: 
Past, Present, and Future of Equality in Iowa (Sept. 28, 2018) (recording available at Drake Univer-
sity School of Law).  Dr. Finkelman’s explanation occurs at 27:00 to 27:55 of this lecture.  He notes, 
at 27:00, that “somebody” asked him about the “apparent redundancy” with both “race” and “color” 
in the text of the Fifteenth Amendment.  “Somebody” referred to the author of this Article, as earlier 
in the day, I had a conversation with him about the topic.  Although framed in a different manner, 
Dr. Finkelman’s insights echoed the intuitions I had developed as I was doing research for this 
Article.  See supra text accompanying notes 153–159. 
 161.  See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (“[E]nforced separation of the races . . . 
neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property with-
out due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Gabriel Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About 
Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1374 (2008) (arguing that in early Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, “due process and equal protection claims were not distinct: they were two sides of 
the same coin”). 
 162.  83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36 (1872).   
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citizenship.163  Consequently, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
took on prominence, and the latter came to be the main provision to protect 
against race and color discrimination. 
This Part examines how the United States Supreme Court treated race 
and color in its early equal protection jurisprudence.  It considers nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century cases that involved the exclusion of Black Amer-
icans from jury service, which were the Court’s earliest statements on race 
and color discrimination.  It then looks at Plessy v. Ferguson164 and other 
major equal protection cases in the first half-century after ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  These cases illustrate that the Supreme Court 
treated race and color discrimination as essentially the same—both forms of 
discrimination against Black Americans.  By the various ways it referred to 
Black Americans, the Court seemed to view race and color as two ways of 
designating the same group.  Language by some of the Justices suggests that 
they viewed color as a means to identify an individual’s race.  But im-
portantly, the Court also did not develop any color discrimination jurispru-
dence independent of its race discrimination jurisprudence. 
A.  Nineteenth-Century Jury Service Cases 
During the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court decided several 
cases which involved the exclusion of Black jurors.  Through these opinions, 
the Court notes that African Americans were discriminated against based on 
both “race” and “color,” though the distinction between the two was still not 
clear.  Nevertheless, it is apparent that race and color provisions were equally 
important and worked together to protect against racism. 
Justice William Strong wrote the Court’s opinions in the first three of 
these cases, which were decided in the same term.  Strauder v. West Virgin-
ia165 involved Taylor Strauder, a “very light mulatto,”166 who was convicted 
of murder by an all-white jury.  Strauder challenged the exclusion of Black 
                                                          
 163.  Id.  In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court also stated that all of the Reconstruction 
Amendments were intended to protect African Americans against race and color discrimination.  
See id. at 71–72 (“It is true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by 
speaking of his color and his slavery.  But it is just as true that each of the other articles was ad-
dressed to the grievances of that race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.”).  Ten years 
later, the Civil Rights Cases also limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, ruling that it only 
applied to state actors.  109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 164.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 165.  100 U.S. 303 (1879).  For a more detailed analysis of the Strauder opinion, see Sanford 
Levinson, Why Strauder v. West Virginia is the Most Important Single Source of Insight on the 
Tensions Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 603 (2018). 
 166.  Horrible Murder, WHEELING DAILY INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 19, 1872, reprinted at Taylor 
Strauder Case, W. VA. DEP’T ARTS, CULTURE & HIST., http://www.wvculture.org/history/afri-
canamericans/strauder01.html (last visited June 10, 2020).  
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jurors on equal protection grounds.  Justice Strong’s opinion illustrates that 
the Reconstruction Amendments protected against race and color discrimi-
nation: 
If the defendant has a right to have a jury selected for the trial of 
his case without discrimination against all persons of his race or 
color, because of their race or color, the right, if not created, is pro-
tected by those [Reconstruction] amendments, and the legislation 
of Congress under them.167 
Here, race and color appear to have equal legal effect: If either is used to 
exclude jurors, then a defendant’s rights would be violated.  Other language 
in Strauder suggests that in this specific instance, Black jurors were excluded 
“because of color alone”: 
And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to 
submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from 
which the State has expressly excluded every man of his race, be-
cause of color alone, however well qualified in other respects, is 
not a denial to him of equal legal protection?168 
The opinion goes on to state: “Concluding, therefore, that the statute of West 
Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors, as it does, against negroes 
because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws 
to a colored man . . . .”169  Twice, the Strauder Court notes that Black jurors 
were excluded “because of [their] color alone.”170  One might infer that Jus-
tice Strong saw “color” as a defining feature of race—perhaps the means used 
to identify race.171 
In Virginia v. Rives,172 the issue was exclusion of Black jurors.  Refer-
encing Strauder, Justice Strong reiterated that the Equal Protection Clause 
prevented race and color discrimination not only through legislation, but also 
through the actions of state officials: 
[A]s we endeavored to maintain in the case of Strauder v. West 
Virginia, that discrimination by law against the colored race, be-
cause of their color, in the selection of jurors, is a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws to a negro when he is put upon trial for 
an alleged criminal offence against a State, the laws of Virginia 
                                                          
 167.   Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. 
 168.   Id. at 309 (emphasis added). 
 169.   Id. at 310 (emphasis added). 
 170.  See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text. 
 171.  Almost 140 years later, the Defendant-Appellant in Bridgeforth would argue that in a typ-
ical peremptory challenge and Batson case, jurors are dismissed upon observation of their skin color, 
without formally classifying them by race.  See infra text accompanying notes 380–386.  This may 
or may not have occurred in nineteenth-century jury service cases: Jurors could also have been 
excluded ante exclusion from jury service rolls.  Nevertheless, the language suggests that the Jus-
tices viewed “color” as the typical means to differentiate by race. 
 172.  100 U.S. 313 (1879). 
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make no such discrimination.  If, as was alleged in the argument, 
though it does not appear in the petition or record, the officer to 
whom was intrusted the selection of the persons from whom the 
juries for the indictment and trial of the petitioners were drawn, 
disregarding the statute of the State, confined his selection to white 
persons, and refused to select any persons of the colored race, 
solely because of their color, his action . . . . was the act of the 
State, and was prohibited by the constitutional amendment.173 
Again, the Supreme Court’s language here suggests that skin color is typi-
cally the feature used to identify race.  It twice notes that discrimination 
against the “colored race” occurred “because of their color.”174  Besides “col-
ored race,” Justice Strong also used the term “negro”175 to refer to African 
Americans. 
Justice Strong also wrote the opinion in Ex parte Virginia,176 which also 
dealt with the exclusion of Black jurors.  Here, he did seem to differentiate 
between race and color.  He noted, “an officer charged by law with the selec-
tion of jurors . . . did then and there exclude and fail to select as grand and 
petit jurors certain citizens . . . of African race and black color.”177  This lan-
guage suggests a distinction: Justice Strong viewed “African” as a racial 
background (denoting ancestry) and “black” as skin color. 
Other jury service cases show similar language trends.  In Neal v. Del-
aware,178 Justice Harlan framed the issues as “whether . . . citizens of the Af-
rican race . . . were . . . excluded from service on juries because of their 
color.”179  Similarly, in Gibson v. Mississippi,180 also written by Justice Har-
lan, the opinion refers to “exclusion of the black race from juries because of 
their color was not less forbidden by law than would be the exclusion from 
juries, in [s]tates where the blacks have the majority, or the white race be-
cause of their color.”181  This opinion refers to the “African race”182 and “Af-
rican descent,”183 and it uses the term “colored” in many places.184  In these 
opinions, only the term “White” was used for White Americans; conversely, 
Black Americans were described in many different ways. 
                                                          
 173.   Id. at 321 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  100 U.S. 339 (1879). 
 177.  Id. at 340 (emphasis added).  
 178.  103 U.S. 370 (1880). 
 179.  Id. at 387. 
 180.   162 U.S. 565 (1896). 
 181.  Id. at 581 (emphasis added). 
 182.  Id. at 580. 
 183.  Id. at 583–84. 
 184.  See generally id.   
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In all of these cases, race and color were of equal importance when de-
scribing discrimination against Black Americans, although the Supreme 
Court did not appear to draw any legal distinctions between the two terms.185  
Importantly, nothing in these opinions privileges “race” over “color.”  Equal 
protection applied equally to both.186 
Language used in the opinions resembles that of the Reconstruction 
Framers’ floor statements.  The different Justices who wrote the opinions 
used many different terms to describe Black Americans.  This may again re-
flect various understandings of race, color, and the relationship between the 
two.187  Implicitly, the Court seemed to recognize that either “race” or “color” 
could be the basis for discrimination against African Americans.  The Justices 
also seemed to suggest that skin color is often the means to identify and dis-
criminate on the basis of “race” (perhaps denoting ancestry).  The infamous 
case of Plessy v. Ferguson188 further illustrated this understanding of the re-
lationship between race and color. 
B.  Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 
In addition to the jury cases, other well-known early equal protection 
opinions use “race” and “color” in comparable ways.  The tide of equal pro-
tection turned for the worse in Plessy v. Ferguson, where the infamous “sep-
arate but equal” doctrine originated and diminished civil rights protections 
for African Americans.189  Plessy’s distinction between race and color is also 
                                                          
 185.  Two other Harlan opinions replicated these different trends to one extent or another.  In 
Bush v. Kentucky, Justice Harlan also stated: 
It is sufficient for this assignment to say that the motion was properly overruled, for the 
reason, amongst others, that the grounds upon which it was rested do not clearly and 
distinctly show that the officers who selected and summoned the petit jurors excluded 
from the panel qualified citizens of African descent because of their race or color. 
107 U.S. 110, 117 (1883) (emphasis omitted).  In re Wood uses both “because of their race” and 
“because of their color.”  See generally 140 U.S. 278 (1891).   
Jury service cases in the early twentieth century used these terms in similar fashion.  See gen-
erally Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Rogers v. 
Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900). 
 186.  Another well-known equal protection case during this era was Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356 (1886), which involved discrimination against Chinese Americans in the operation of laun-
dries.  Yick Wo only used the terms “race” and “color” in passing and did not contain the linguistic 
patterns of the jury service cases.  The Supreme Court may have viewed the case differently because 
Chinese Americans rather than African Americans were the plaintiffs.  Also, Professor Gabriel Chin 
argues that Yick Wo was actually a due process case, and that it only used the language of equal 
protection because at the time, it was conventional for courts to consider due process and equal 
protection claims together.  See Chin, supra note 161. 
 187.  See supra note 154. 
 188.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 189.  Id. (upholding separate railroad cars for Black and White passengers). 
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vague, but language used by the Court still suggests the Justices viewed color 
as the means of identifying race. 
Justice Henry Billings Brown’s opinion states that “Plessy . . . was as-
signed by officers of the company to the coach used for the race to which he 
belonged, but he insisted upon going into a coach used by the race to which 
he did not belong.”190  Homer Plessy appeared White: “[P]etitioner was seven 
eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored 
blood was not discernible in him . . . .”191  Plessy was not and could not have 
been identified as Black by his skin color.  The case was pre-designed as a 
test challenge to Louisiana’s law requiring segregation in railroad cars.192 
When the Plessy majority rejected Homer Plessy’s Thirteenth Amend-
ment claim, the Court stated explicitly that color is the means by which races 
are distinguished: 
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the 
white and colored races––a distinction which is founded in the 
color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as 
white men are distinguished from the other race by color––has no 
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestab-
lish a state of involuntary servitude.193 
With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plessy Court opined: 
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the ab-
solute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of 
things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based 
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political 
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfac-
tory to either.194  
The Plessy Court here contrasted “equality of the two races” with “a com-
mingling of the two races,” but when referring to means of discrimination to 
be abolished (or not, in this case), it referred to “distinctions based upon 
color.”  This may suggest the Justices believed that skin color typically iden-
tified a person’s race—although ironically, not for Homer Plessy.195 
                                                          
 190.  Id. at 541. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  See A Brief History of the Evolution of the Case, PLESSY & FERGUSON FOUND., 
http://www.plessyandferguson.org/history/ (last visited May 8, 2020) (“Every detail of Plessy’s 
case was strategically planned . . . .”). 
 193.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added). 
 194.  Id. at 544 (emphasis added). 
 195.  See supra text accompanying note 191.  The terms “African,” “colored,” and “negro” are 
also used in the Plessy opinion.  Also, both “because of color” and “because of race” appear in the 
opinion.  See generally id.  Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy seems to use race and color 
interchangeably:  
  The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. . . . But . . . [o]ur 
Constitution is color-blind . . . . The law regards man as man, and takes no account of . . . 
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C.  Early Twentieth-Century Cases 
Early twentieth century cases show a similar pattern with respect to the 
use of “race” and “color.”  The Supreme Court did not make any distinction 
between “race” and “color” discrimination, though some of its language sug-
gests that the Justices viewed “color” as the primary means to identify race.  
In Giles v. Harris,196 a voting rights case, plaintiff Jackson Giles, “applied in 
March, 1902, for registration as a voter, and was refused arbitrarily on the 
ground of his color, together with large numbers of other duly qualified ne-
groes, while all white men were registered.”197  The group being discrimi-
nated against is described in race terms—“duly qualified negroes”—but the 
means of discrimination is again described in terms of color—“refused arbi-
trarily on the ground of his color.”198 
In Buchanan v. Warley,199 Justice William Rufus Day’s opinion, the Su-
preme Court struck down a Kentucky statute that restricted property owners 
from selling their property based on the buyer’s race.200  Although this ruling 
was based on the Due Process Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Supreme Court noted “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes 
enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored 
man to acquire property without state legislation discriminating against him 
solely because of color.”201  The opinion also refers to “compulsory separa-
tion of the races on account of color.”202  Again, “color” appears to be the 
means to discriminate by race. 
D.  Racing Color 
These early Fourteenth Amendment cases illustrate how the Supreme 
Court treated “color” as an anti-discrimination provision in its equal protec-
tion jurisprudence.  Three trends emerge from these cases: 
1.  Two Sides of a Coin 
First, race and color were twin claims: two sides of a coin.  The two 
were considered together, and color claims did not just apply to a subclass 
                                                          
his color . . . . It is, therefore, to be regretted . . . that it is competent for a [s]tate to regu-
late the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.   
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  In addition to “white race,” Justice Harlan uses the terms “colored 
race,” “black race,” and “Chinese race” in his dissent.  See generally id.   
 196.  189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
 197.  Id. at 482 (emphasis added). 
 198.  Id. (emphasis added).  
 199.  245 U.S. 60 (1917).  
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 79 (emphasis added). 
 202.  Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
 
2020] CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN LIVING COLOR 915 
such as dark-skinned African Americans.  In all of the opinions, the Supreme 
Court’s use of “race” and “color” overlaps significantly, and the language 
suggests that they were dual, equivalent provisions to protect against racial 
discrimination (or not in many of these cases).  Both race and color provisions 
were intended to protect all African Americans (or all “persons of color”) 
from race discrimination.  Moreover, these provisions were equally im-
portant: The Court’s opinions did not privilege one over the other. 
2.  Different Shades of Black 
Second, much like the Reconstruction Era floor debates, there are dif-
ferences in how the Court refers to White and African Americans.  In the 
cases noted above, White Americans are simply described as “White”—save 
one reference to “Caucasian” when describing Homer Plessy’s descent.203  
Conversely, the opinions use a variety of terms to refer to African Americans: 
“negro,” “black,” and “colored.”204  This again reflects the different under-
standings of Blackness and suggests that race and color anti-discrimination 
protections together may have captured these various understandings.205 
3.  Equal but Not Separate 
Third, although the Justices recognized color discrimination was as im-
portant as race discrimination, they did not separate the two in any meaning-
ful way.  The Court’s language acknowledges discrimination occurred “be-
cause of color”206 or “because of their color”207 or “on account of color.”208  
However, beyond these subtle allusions to color as the distinction between 
races and the means to identify race, color discrimination simply meant race 
discrimination, perhaps when accomplished via perception of skin color.  
This may have reflected how the Justices thought about race, color, and the 
relationship between the two.  There continued to be different understandings 
of race, some more closely correlated with skin color than others.  And de-
spite the attention it paid to both race and color in these early equal protection 
cases, the Supreme Court never forged an independent jurisprudence around 
color discrimination. 
After Plessy, social distinctions based on color (that is, racial distinc-
tions) were permissible under the law.  Civil rights advocates would eventu-
ally turn the tide and successfully use the Equal Protection Clause to combat 
                                                          
 203.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896). 
 204.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 173–175, 181–184, 197; supra note 195. 
 205.  See supra note 154. 
 206.  See supra text accompanying notes 168–169, 201. 
 207.  See supra text accompanying notes 173–174, 179, 181; supra note 185. 
 208.  See supra text accompanying notes 139, 149, 202. 
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race discrimination.  But as this happened, “color” became subsumed by 
“race” in equal protection jurisprudence—as the next Part will show. 
IV.  “COLORBLIND” 
Beginning in mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to 
broaden the scope of equal protection and strike down laws that discriminated 
against African Americans.  In academia, progressive scholars had begun de-
bunking the concept of race as a biological entity and arguing that it was a 
social construct.209  Responding to the racist ideology of Nazi Germany, sci-
entists also started to emphasize historical circumstances rather than genetic 
differences as the basis for racial inequality.210  The NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund (“LDF”), led by Thurgood Marshall, employed these ideas to bring 
challenges to de jure segregation—challenges that would eventually lead to 
Brown v. Board of Education I (“Brown I”).211  In this context, as World War 
II progressed and ended, the Court began shifting away from stating that 
equal protection violations occurred “because of color.”  The Court’s shift 
here may have reflected the diminished emphasis on physical differences in 
defining race,212 in favor of highlighting social inequalities.  As this occurred 
and in the aftermath, some opinions continued to use the term “color” in con-
junction with race, but those which did so were often just quoting language 
from earlier cases.213  This Part will explore these trends and their implica-
tions. 
                                                          
 209.  See, e.g., ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN’S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE 
(1942); MYRDAL, supra note 39. 
 210.  See WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 138–39 
(1996) (noting statements made by scientists “in response to the racially based policies of the Third 
Reich.”). 
 211.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
 212.  See MYRDAL, supra note 39.  Even before it became more progressive, the Supreme Court 
sometimes espoused that race (at least with respect to Whiteness) was not a biological entity, but 
one defined by common understanding.  See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209 (1923) 
(“[T]he term ‘race’ . . . must be applied to a group of living persons now possessing in common the 
requisite characteristics, not to groups of persons who are supposed to be or really are descended 
from some remote, common ancestor . . . .”); id. at 211 (“The word ‘Caucasian’ . . . . includes not 
only the Hindu but some of the Polynesians, (that is the Maori, Tahitians, Samoans, Hawaiians and 
others), the Hamites of Africa, upon the ground of the Caucasic cast of their features, though in 
color they range from brown to black.” (footnote omitted)).   
 213.  It is important to note, however, that the Court has still often viewed skin color as the 
defining feature of race.  See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (“It may well be, 
for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that . . . skin color[] should be treated as a sur-
rogate for race under an equal protection analysis.”).  It is likely that by “certain ethnic groups and 
in some communities,” the Court was referring to groups of Black people.  At other times, the Court 
has also noted that “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race.”  Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000); 
see also id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Ancestry surely can be a proxy for race, or a pretext 
for invidious racial discrimination.”). 
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A.  Pre-Brown Cases 
Several cases set the stage for Brown I.  One landmark case for equal 
protection jurisprudence came with Korematsu v. United States.214  Although 
Korematsu upheld the internment of Japanese Americans during World War 
II, it was the first case where the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to 
racial classifications.215  Korematsu was about race, not color: the term 
“color” does not appear anywhere in the Court’s opinion or in the dissents.  
Perhaps the Justices linked “color” discrimination mainly to African Ameri-
cans and thus did not consider it in Korematsu.216  But the process of “e-
racing” (erasing) color from equal protection jurisprudence had begun. 
The legal discourse on race and color changed further in the wake of 
World War II, when there was a budding ethos to eliminate racial segrega-
tion.  The NAACP LDF was founded in 1940, one year after Thurgood Mar-
shall was named special counsel of the NAACP.217  Marshall advocated for 
a strategy which aimed to overturn the “separate but equal” doctrine, partic-
ularly in educational institutions, rather than seeking to equalize facilities.218  
The NAACP Board of Directors endorsed Marshall’s integration strategy in 
1948.219  Part of this strategy was to show that skin color is not determinative 
of race,220 and that race itself is not a meaningful concept.221 
                                                          
 214.  323 U.S. 214 (1944).   
 215.  See id. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group 
are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to 
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”). 
 216.  “Color” appeared less in other equal protection cases involving Asian Americans.  See 
supra note 186 (regarding Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)); see also Gong Lum v. Rice, 
275 U.S. 78 (1927) (using terms “colored” and “persons of color” but not “color” by itself).  Both 
Yick Wo and Gong Lum involved Chinese Americans.  
 217.  See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE 
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987).  
 218.  See TUSHNET, supra note 217, at 114 (“I had assumed that the NAACP really meant busi-
ness about an all-out attack against segregation, especially in the public school system.” (quoting 
Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall to Roy Wilkins (1947)). 
 219.  Id. at 115. 
 220.  See Brief for Amici Curiae at 17, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), 1952 WL 47260, 
at *17–18 (arguing that “mature students of anthropology . . . have shown that no significance what-
ever can be attached to skin color alone”).  Bolling was one of the companion cases to Brown v. 
Board of Education. 
 221.  See id. (arguing that “the concept of ‘race’, which has been thought to have a scientific 
explanation . . . [has] been demonstrated by mature students of anthropology to be largely lacking 
even such a foundation”).  Part I of the amicus brief also differentiated between “ancestry” and “skin 
color.”  See id. at *5 (arguing that “[s]eparation of school children by skin color or ancestry has no 
warrant in twentieth-century community experience, proper legislative purpose, or scientific under-
standing and is therefore a meaningless classification violative of the Fifth Amendment” (emphasis 
added)).  This language suggests that LDF differentiated between “race” (framed as ancestry) and 
“color” (framed as skin color). 
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This was a successful legal strategy.  In 1950, with Sweatt v. Painter222 
and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,223 the  Supreme Court respectively 
struck down de jure segregation at the University of Texas Law School and 
the University of Oklahoma Graduate School.  Unlike Korematsu, both of 
these cases had Black plaintiffs.  But neither opinion used the term “color” 
anywhere within its text.  As framed in the Sweatt opinion, the two cases 
“present[ed] different aspects of this general question: To what extent does 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limit the power of 
a state to distinguish between students of different races in professional and 
graduate education in a state university?”224 
The Court’s answer, limited to the facts of each case, was that “the Four-
teenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the state based upon 
race.”225  Whether it was the NAACP’s strategy,226 the changing scientific 
and social views of race,227 or some other factor, there was a diminished em-
phasis on color. 
B.  Brown v. Board of Education I 
LDF’s integration strategy peaked with Brown v. Board of Education I, 
which struck down de jure segregation in public schools.228  Chief Justice 
Earl Warren’s unanimous opinion does not contain the term “color” any-
where in the main text; he only used the term “race.”229  Footnote 13 of Brown 
I poses the question of whether the Supreme Court can “permit an effective 
gradual adjustment . . . from existing segregated systems to a system not 
based on color distinctions.”230  As part of its strategy to promote integration, 
LDF argued that “color distinctions” were not a viable reason for segregation 
and were not even the underlying motivation behind it.  In his oral argument 
                                                          
 222.  339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 223.  339 U.S. 637 (1950).  
 224.  Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631 (emphasis added).  The Sweatt opinion only used the term “Negro” 
to refer to African Americans: It had no references to “black,” “African,” or “colored.”  See gener-
ally id. 
 225.  McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642.  The McLaurin opinion used the term “colored,” but it used the 
term “Negro” more frequently, and it did not use terms “black” or  “African.”  See generally id.   
 226.  See supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text. 
 227.  See supra note 209. 
 228.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  In Brown v. Board of Education II, the Supreme Court ordered the 
remedy to be implemented “with all deliberate speed[,]” thus extending the timeline for actual de-
segregation of schools.  349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 229.  The Brown I opinion does use the terms “colored children” and “Negro.”  349 U.S. 294 
(1955).  The opinion does not use the term “African,” and it only uses “black” when quoting the 
Slaughter-House cases and Strauder.  Id. at 490 n.5. 
 230.  Id. at 496 n.13 (emphasis added).  This language may have been taken from Plessy.  See 
supra notes 193–195 and accompanying text. 
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in Brown I, Thurgood Marshall rhetorically asked why African Americans 
were subject to segregation.  He answered: 
It can’t be because of slavery in the past . . . . [i]t can’t be color 
because there are Negroes as white as the drifted snow, with blue 
eyes, and they are just as segregated . . . . [t]he only thing can 
be . . . [Black Americans] shall be kept as near [slavery] as is pos-
sible.231 
Marshall’s goal here was to highlight the social meaning of segregation 
while arguing that physical differences such as skin color were unimportant.  
In fact, during the Jim Crow era, mixed-race individuals were classified as 
“Black” or “colored”232 and subject to segregation regardless of their skin 
color: Homer Plessy was the hallmark example.233  Some states, such as Mis-
sissippi, defined “persons of mixed blood and any appreciable amount of Ne-
gro blood” as “colored,” even if they were very light-skinned.234  
Consequently, addressing “color” discrimination specifically was not 
central to LDF’s goal.  Rather, Marshall argued that Plessy’s “separate but 
equal” doctrine235 was not reasonable because segregation itself created so-
cial distinctions, and these rather than physical differences were the cause of 
racial inequality.236  In Brown I and its other hallmark civil rights cases, LDF 
brought facial challenges to segregationist policies, focusing on systemic ex-
clusion by race, not on identification of individuals by skin color. 
This was an important and effective strategy.  Nevertheless, buried here 
were the immediate manifestations of discrimination, such as racial profil-
ing237 and peremptory challenges to jurors,238 which occur precisely through 
visual observation of skin color and other physical differences. 
                                                          
 231.   A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM 82–83 (1996) (citing ARGUMENT: 
THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
TOPEKA, 1952–55, at 239–40 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969)) (emphasis added).   
 232.  See STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18.  
 233.  See supra Section III.B. 
 234.  STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18, at 237 (defining “colored” as “in-
clud[ing] not only Negroes but persons of mixed blood having any appreciable amount of Negro 
blood.” (citing Moreau v. Grandich, 75 So. 434 (1917))).  
 235.   Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 236.  Cf. supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 237.  See infra Part VII.B. 
 238.  See infra text accompanying notes 385–386. 
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C.  Post-Brown Cases 
After Brown I, there was still “color” language in the Supreme Court’s 
equal protection rulings, and even reference to skin color as a means to de-
termine race.239  In McLaughlin v. Florida,240 the Court struck down, on equal 
protection grounds, a Florida statute which criminalized cohabitation by un-
married interracial couples.  Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opin-
ion, joined by Justice William Douglas, which stated that he could not 
conceive of a valid legislative purpose under our Constitution for 
a state law which makes the color of a person’s skin the test of 
whether his conduct is a criminal offense. . . . [A]ppellants were 
convicted, fined, and imprisoned under a statute which made their 
conduct criminal only because they were of different races. . . . [I]t 
is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Consti-
tution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race 
of the actor.241 
Justice Stewart’s opinion is significant here for two reasons.  First, it 
denotes “color of a person’s skin” as the “test” for race, thus referencing color 
as the visual means to identify race.  Justice Stewart may have underscored 
this point in McLaughlin because one of the appellants’ claims was that the 
Florida statute violated the Due Process Clause, due to its unconstitutionally 
vague definition of race.242  The appellants in McLaughlin also argued that 
the method for ascertaining race in this case was physical appearance incom-
mensurate with the statutory definition of race that is rooted in ancestry: 
At the trial one of the arresting officers was permitted, over objec-
tion, to state his conclusion as to the race of each appellant based 
on his observation of their physical appearance.  Appellants claim 
that the statutory definition is circular in that it provides no inde-
pendent means of determining the race of a defendant’s ancestors 
and that testimony based on appearance is impermissible because 
not related to any objective standard.243 
The Supreme Court did not reach this due process claim, deciding the case 
instead on broader equal protection grounds. 
                                                          
 239.  See supra note 213. 
 240.  379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 241.  Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 242.  Id. at 187 n.6. (majority opinion) (defining “Negro” to “include every person having one-
eighth or more of African or negro blood.” (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.01(6)).  McLaughlin 
employed the range of terms used to refer to African Americans, as it dealt with a Florida statute 
that contained these definitions.  Id. (stating that “Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1.01(6) provides: ‘The words 
“negro,” “colored,” “colored persons,” “mulatto” or “persons of color,” when applied to persons, 
include every person having one-eighth or more of African or negro blood.’”). 
 243.  Id. at 187–88 n.6. 
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Second, Justice Stewart’s concurrence in McLaughlin was quoted by the 
Supreme Court three years later in Chief Justice Earl Warren’s majority opin-
ion in Loving v. Virginia,244 when the Court struck down a Virginia statute 
which outlawed interracial marriage.  This quote was the only reference to 
“color” in the Loving opinion.245  
These cases show that beginning around World War II, “color” was sub-
sumed by “race” under equal protection doctrine.246  This trend was visible 
through the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  Even within the 
modern cases involving the exclusion of Black jurors—the very type of cases 
where color had appeared frequently a century earlier—the term largely dis-
appeared from the text of Supreme Court opinions. 
D.  Modern Jury Service Cases 
Recent Supreme Court opinions involving racial exclusion from jury 
service most clearly demonstrate the disappearance of color.  These cases 
contain very few references to “color,” even though “color” language was 
used frequently in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century jury service 
                                                          
 244.  388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial 
classifications . . . be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny’ . . . . [T]wo members of this Court have 
already stated that they ‘cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color 
of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense.” (emphasis added) (quoting 
McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring))). 
 245.  Ironically, Justice Stewart himself wrote a separate concurrence in Loving, where he quoted 
a different part of his McLaughlin concurrence—a part that used the term “race” but not the term 
“color.”  See id. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[I]t is simply not possible for a state law to be valid 
under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 184, 198 (Stewart, J., concurring))).  Perhaps 
Justice Stewart recognized that skin color as a means to identify race was directly at play in 
McLaughlin but was not always at play in Virginia statutes defining race—because race here was 
defined in terms of ancestry rather than skin color.  See id. at 5 n.4.  (noting that under Virginia 
Code section 20-54 (1960), “the term ‘white person’ shall apply only to such person as has no trace 
whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood 
of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white per-
sons[,]” and under Virginia Code section 1-14 (1960), “[e]very person in whom there is ascertaina-
ble any Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and every person not a 
colored person having one fourth or more of American Indian blood shall be deemed an American 
Indian; except that members of Indian tribes . . . having one fourth or more of Indian blood and less 
than one sixteenth of Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians.”).  
 246.  There was a similar pattern in Fifteenth Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court.  
In Guinn v. United States, Chief Justice Edward Douglass White noted that the accusation was that 
“certain election officers . . . conspired . . . to deprive certain negro citizens, on account of their race 
and color, of a right to vote.”  238 U.S. 347, 354 (1915).  Both “race” and “color” are used at several 
places in the opinion.  See generally id.  Forty-five years later, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960), Justice Frankfurter’s opinion used only the term “race”: It did not use the term “color” 
at all, although the Gomillion opinion did refer to “colored voters” and “colored citizens.”  See 
generally id. 
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cases,247 and even though skin color has often been the means used to identify 
race when Black jurors are excluded.248  In Batson v. Kentucky,249 the basis 
for color-based challenge in People v. Bridgeforth,250 the Court’s only refer-
ence to “color” is a quote from Strauder v. West Virginia.251  Later, in Geor-
gia v. McCollum,252  Purkett v. Elem,253 Miller-El v. Cockrell,254 Johnson v. 
California,255 Miller-El v. Dretke,256 Rice v. Collins,257 Snyder v. Louisi-
ana,258 Rivera v. Illinois,259 and Foster v. Chatman,260 the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed race-based Batson challenges without a single use of the term 
“color” in any of the opinions.261  In its most recent Batson case, Flowers v. 
Mississippi,262 the Court’s various opinions used the term “color” three times, 
once quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and twice quoting Strauder.263  In 
contrast, the term “race” appeared 122 times in the Flowers opinions.264 
E.  “E-racing” Color 
Color was thus “e-raced”: subsumed by race in equal protection cases.  
Some of the Supreme Court’s later equal protection opinions have used the 
                                                          
 247.  See supra Section III.A. 
 248.  See infra text accompanying notes 380–386. 
 249.  476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also supra note 3. 
 250.  69 N.E.3d 611, 613–14 (N.Y. 2016); see also supra note 3. 
 251.  Baston, 476 U.S. at 87 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879)). 
 252.  505 U.S. 42 (1992).  The McCollum opinion did use the term “color of state law” but not 
“color” as denoting a visual quality. 
 253.  514 U.S. 765 (1995). 
 254.  537 U.S. 322 (2003). 
 255.  545 U.S. 162 (2005). 
 256.  545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
 257.  546 U.S. 333 (2006). 
 258.  552 U.S. 472 (2008). 
 259.  556 U.S. 148 (2009). 
 260.  136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016). 
 261.  See generally supra notes 252–260.  All of these opinions did use the term “race”—often 
numerous times.  Id.  There were other opinions which used “color” sparingly or in a different 
context.  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (four uses of “color” or 
“skin color” and thirty-six uses of “race”); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (two uses 
of “skin color” and fifty uses of “race”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (eight uses of “color” 
and eighty-one uses of “race”).  Edmonson also used the term “color of state law” to denote the 
appearance of authority, not race or skin color.  See generally id. 
 262.  139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).  
 263.  See id. at 2238–39.  
 264.  See generally id. 
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term “color,” but these opinions are generally just quoting prior cases.265  De-
spite Justice Thurgood Marshall’s protestations,266 the Supreme Court some-
times continued to espouse that skin color could be a proxy for race.267  Nev-
ertheless, because the Court recognized only racism and not colorism, “color” 
had no independent meaning and largely disappeared in the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court “e-raced” color in another way: It adopted a “color-
blind” ideology, rooted in an anticlassification view of civil rights.268  Alt-
hough race was still there, it became neutral and even antithetical to civil 
rights.  Color did not exist in equal protection doctrine, until it reemerged in 
Bridgeforth.  But while color became subsumed by race under equal protec-
tion, a different type of color-based anti-discrimination jurisprudence 
emerged under modern civil rights statutes.  As the next Part shows, this ju-
risprudence did focus specifically on colorism and distinguish it from racism. 
                                                          
 265.  See, e.g., supra notes 249–251 and accompanying text.  Also, it is sometimes obvious the 
use of “color” does not denote observation of skin color, but just a metaphor to denote race.  See, 
e.g., University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“The applicant . . . will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because 
he was not the right color . . . .”); id. at 320 (“[W]hen a State’s distribution of benefits or imposition 
of burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of a person’s skin . . . .”).  Bakke was a case involving 
affirmative action in higher education: Universities typically determine an applicants’ race by self-
identification on an application, not by observing their skin color.  Id. 
 266.  During his years on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Marshall remained keen to 
the distinction between race and skin color.  He raised the point in the oral arguments for Shaare 
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb. 481 U.S. 615 (1987).  See Oral Argument at 38:39, 38:52, Shaare 
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (No. 85-2156), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2156 (Justice Marshall noting that his father was “white with 
blond hair and blue eyes[]” but that “[h]e was a Negro”).  Here, Justice Marshall was reacting to 
Respondent’s Counsel’s contention that “one obvious way . . . [to] identif[y] . . . a non-white person 
would be by reference to immutable physical characteristics such as skin color.”  Id. at 38:25.   
Later, Justice Marshall noted that he “just never liked” using the term “Black.”  Justice Mar-
shall, on ‘Afro-American’: Yes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1989), https://www.ny-
times.com/1989/10/17/us/justice-marshall-on-afro-american-yes.html.  Although he did use 
“black” in some of his later opinions, Justice Marshall initially used “Negro” and then came to 
prefer “Afro-American.”  Id. 
 267.  See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (“It may well be, for certain ethnic 
groups and in some communities, that . . . skin color[] should be treated as a surrogate for race under 
an equal protection analysis.”). 
 268.  There is a general debate over whether American civil rights law, including equal protec-
tion, should espouse an antisubordination view or an anticlassification view.  See generally Jack M. 
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordi-
nation?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2003) (defining antisubordination as the view “that law 
should reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically op-
pressed groups,” and defining anticlassification as the view “that the government may not classify 
people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category”). 
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V.  “COLORABLE” CLAIMS 
In modern civil rights law, color discrimination typically refers only to 
bias targeting skin color.269  Most often, this is framed as a within-group phe-
nomenon: for example, light-skinned Black Americans discriminating 
against dark-skinned Black Americans, or vice versa.270  Such claims have 
been recognized under civil rights statutes.  Unlike early equal protection ju-
risprudence, color is separate from race in these modern claims.  However, 
color discrimination claims are only viable when race or national origin dis-
crimination is not applicable.271 
This Part examines how modern color discrimination is legally defined 
and differentiated from race discrimination.  It considers the legislative his-
tory of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which protects against em-
ployment discrimination and has been the vehicle for most modern color dis-
crimination claims.  It also examines how the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which is responsible for enforcement 
of Title VII, has defined color discrimination and race discrimination.  Sub-
sequently, this Part looks at color discrimination cases under Title VII, as 
well as the small number of color claims brought under other civil rights stat-
utes. 
A.  Defining Modern Color Discrimination 
Various civil rights statutes, many of which contain the terms “race” and 
“color,” have been the primary vehicles for the development of modern color 
discrimination claims.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains both terms, 
right next to each other and separated by a comma, in Titles II, III, IV, VI, 
VII, VIII, IX, and X.272  This language may have been parroted from the 
original version of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.273 
“Color” was not defined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Arkansas Sen-
ator John Little McClellan asked his colleagues twice about the definition of 
                                                          
 269.  See, e.g., Baynes, supra note 9, at 133 (“A dark-skinned person of color is likely to en-
counter more discrimination than his/her light-skinned counterpart.” (footnote omitted)). 
 270.  See WALKER, supra note 46, at 290 (noting that “[c]olorism . . . [is] preferential treatment 
of same-race people based solely on their color”).  But see Jones, supra note 9, at 1498–99 (“It is 
important to note that colorism operates both intraracially and interracially.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 271.  Banks, supra note 9, at 1727. 
 272.  Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241. Only Titles I, V, and XI lack the terms “race” and “color.”  
Id.  Also, Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) states, in part: “[n]o voting qualification or prerequi-
site . . . shall be imposed or applied . . . to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color . . . .”  Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976)).  Other civil rights laws also contained the terms “race” and 
“color,” but these are the most well-known.  
 273.  Ironically, Section 1981, the modern iteration of that Act, does not contain the language.  
See infra text accompanying note 319. 
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“color” within the bill.274  Senator John Tower of Texas acknowledged that 
“[t]he term is ambiguous”275 and further stated that “we get into a real prob-
lem when we go into questions of color, religion, sex, or national origin.  
There can be all sorts of discussions along those lines.”276  Representative 
Timothy Abernethy of Mississippi asked explicitly whether Title VII would 
make it illegal for “an employer not to hire a person on the ground of race—
that is, color . . . because the skin of the applicant is too dark?”277  Repre-
sentative Abernethy also referred to intraracial discrimination, inquiring 
whether the statute would apply “where light-skinned Negroes refuse to hire 
Negroes of dark skin.”278  Representative Emanuel Celler replied in the af-
firmative to both questions.279 
Professor Kate Sablosky Elengold notes that there was confusion in sep-
arating race from color and distinguishing between race discrimination and 
color discrimination.280  Ultimately, “color” was not defined in the statute, 
perhaps because legislators felt that the principles underlying the statute 
would allow courts or administrative agencies to determine its meaning.281  
After several cases involving color discrimination,282 this is what happened.  
Most skin color discrimination claims have occurred under Title VII’s prohi-
bition on employment discrimination,283 and the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission has set forth the following definition: 
[C]olor discrimination occurs when a person is discriminated 
against based on the lightness, darkness, or other color character-
istic of the person.  Even though race and color clearly overlap, 
they are not synonymous.  Thus, color discrimination can occur 
between persons of different races or ethnicities, or between per-
sons of the same race or ethnicity.284 
The EEOC’s definition of race discrimination is broader: It can involve 
not only skin color, but a number of different characteristics, including an-
                                                          
 274.  110 CONG. REC. 7772 (1964); see also Elengold, supra note 9, at 12–13. 
 275.  110 CONG. REC. 7772.   
 276.  Id. 
 277.  110 CONG. REC. 2553 (1964); see also Elengold, supra note 9, at 14. 
 278.  110 CONG. REC. 2554. 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  Elengold, supra note 9, at 14–15. 
 281.  Id. at 15. 
 282.  See infra Part V.B. 
 283.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).   
 284.  U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15-III 
(2006) (footnotes omitted), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html#III.  
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cestry, physiognomy and appearance, culture, perception (that is, discrimina-
tion based on perceived, rather than actual, race),285 and association (that is, 
discrimination based on having interracial marriages, friendships, etc.).286 
The EEOC’s definitions of race and color discrimination are not binding 
on the federal courts.287  Nevertheless, courts have also adopted a narrow 
view of color discrimination, treating it as subordinate to race discrimina-
tion.288  Color discrimination is not a viable cause of action if intent to dis-
criminate by race can be shown.289  Additionally, “color” discrimination has 
only been applied in situations where a particular color-based subgroup (e.g., 
dark-skinned African Americans) is targeted. 
B.  Modern Color Discrimination Claims 
Under modern civil rights statutes, color discrimination has typically 
come into play in two situations: (1) When the plaintiff’s race is ambiguous 
and a national origin claim is not viable; and (2) If discrimination occurs only 
against a member of a racial subclass, such as a dark-skinned African Amer-
ican.290  Courts have recognized both intraracial color claims (for example, a 
light-skinned Black defendant discriminating against a dark-skinned Black 
plaintiff) and interracial color claims (for example, a White defendant dis-
criminating against dark-skinned African Americans but not light-skinned 
African Americans).  Such color claims have been brought under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 42, sections 1981 and 1982 of the United 
States Code, and the Fair Housing Act.291   
1.  Title VII 
Most of the jurisprudence on color discrimination has occurred under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964292—specifically prohibition of employment dis-
crimination under Title VII.  Although Title VII covers both interracial and 
intraracial discrimination, most Title VII color claims have been intraracial—
between members of the same racial group.293  In Felix v. Marquez,294 a 1981 
case between two Puerto Rican citizens, the United States District Court for 
                                                          
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Kaili Moss, Black Hair(tage): Career Liability or Civil Rights Issue?, 25 WM. & MARY J. 
RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 191, 209 (2018) (citing EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 
1018, 1022 (11th Cir. 2016)). 
 288.  See infra Part V.B. 
 289.  Banks, supra note 9, at 1727. 
 290.  Id. 
 291.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012). 
 292.  Id. § 2000e–2000e-17.  
 293.  See Banks, supra note 9, at 1711–12. 
 294.  No. 78-2314, 1981 WL 275, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1981). 
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the District of Columbia noted that the “case presents, for perhaps the first 
time in a federal court, an allegation of color discrimination that is not sub-
ordinated to a more familiar claim of racial discrimination.”295  In denying 
the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Felix court recognized a 
claim of color discrimination,296 stating: “Color may be a rare claim, because 
color is usually mixed with or subordinated to claims of race discrimination, 
but considering the mixture of races and ancestral national origins in Puerto 
Rico, color may be the most practical claim to present.”297  Here, the court 
acknowledges that color discrimination claims are often subsumed within 
race discrimination claims—an observation that applies broadly to all laws 
that include color.298  Importantly though, the Felix court recognizes that 
color discrimination claims can themselves be viable options, particularly 
when race, national origin, and other statuses are undetermined or subservi-
ent to color. 
Professor Cynthia Nance notes that more color claims have been 
brought by dark-skinned plaintiffs of all races than by light-skinned plain-
tiffs.299  In the federal district courts, there have been cases involving dark-
skinned plaintiffs from a variety of backgrounds: Hill v. Textron Automotive 
Industries300 (relatively dark-skinned White), Brack v. Shoney’s, Inc.301 
(Black), and Sidique v. University302 and Munshi v. Alliant Techsystems, 
Inc.303 (Asian Indian).  Nevertheless, one of the more widely cited Title VII 
color cases involved a light-skinned plaintiff.  In Walker v. Secretary of the 
Treasury, IRS,304 a light-skinned Black employee brought suit against her 
dark-skinned Black supervisor.305  The Walker court recognized a Title VII 
color claim, contending that “statutes and case law repeatedly and distinctly 
refer to race and color. . . . [and] Congress and the Supreme Court refer to 
race and color in the same phrase,” both of which imply that race and color 
are distinct.306  Unlike the early equal protection cases, courts have distin-
guished between race and color discrimination in modern civil rights law. 
                                                          
 295.  Id. at *11.   
 296.  Felix v. Marquez, No. 78-2314, 1980 WL 242, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 1980). 
 297.  Id.  
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Nance, supra note 9, at 465. 
 300.  160 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.N.H. 2001). 
 301.  249 F. Supp. 2d 938 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). 
 302.  No. 02-365, 2003 WL 22290334, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2003). 
 303.  No. CIV. 99-516PAMJGL, 2001 WL 1636494, at *1 (D. Minn. June 26, 2001).  For other 
Title VII color discrimination claims involving South Asian Americans, see Banks, supra note 77. 
 304.  713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 953 F.2d 650 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 305.  Id. at 404–05. 
 306.  Id. at 406 (emphasis omitted).  More recently, Jones v. Jefferson Parish also recognized a 
Title VII color discrimination claim by a light-skinned Black plaintiff against a dark-skinned Black 
employer.  No. 12-2191, 2013 WL 871539, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2013). 
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Until recently, only federal district courts had explicitly recognized 
color claims.307  This changed in 2015, with the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit ruling in Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino 
Plaza, L.L.C.308  The plaintiff, a dark-skinned Black woman, was denied a 
promotion to a managerial position.309  The casino’s general manager and his 
wife repeatedly told another employee that the plaintiff was “too black to do 
various tasks at the casino.”310  The general manager also stated that he would 
not allow “a dark skinned black person [to] handle any money.”311  The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to the defendant, largely because most 
of the general managers at the casino were Black.312  The Fifth Circuit re-
versed, noting that: (1) Recognition of color discrimination is “unequivocal” 
in the text of Title VII;313 and (2) the defendant’s statements were direct evi-
dence of color discrimination.314 
Some Title VII color claims have also sometimes resulted in settle-
ments.315  However, courts have dismissed many color claims,316 and Profes-
sor Taunya Lovell Banks argues that it is difficult for plaintiffs to prevail 
even in those claims that are recognized.317 
                                                          
 307.  Benjamin L. Riddle, “Too Black”: Waitress’s Claim of Color Bias Raises Novel Title VII 
Claim, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/too-black-waitress-
s-claim-color-bias-raises-novel-title-vii-claim (“[T]he U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
rul[ing] in Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, LLC . . . [was] the first time that a ‘color’ 
claim under Title VII succeeds as a separate and distinct claim from ‘race’ in Federal Court at the 
appellate level . . . .”).  Previously, the Seventh Circuit had noted in dicta that Title VI and Title VII 
allow claims of color discrimination.  See Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“Title VI, like Title VII, forbids discrimination on the basis of ‘color’ as well as on the basis of 
‘race.’  Light-skinned blacks sometimes discriminate against dark-skinned blacks, and vice versa, 
and either form of discrimination is literally color discrimination.”). 
 308.  778 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 309.  Id. at 474–75, 477 n.4. 
 310.  Id. at 475. 
 311.  Id. 
 312.  Id. at 475 n.2. 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Id. at 477. 
 315.  EEOC v. Pioneer Hotel, Inc., Case No. 2:11-CV-01588-LRH-GWF (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 
2015) (Notice of Settlement); EEOC v. Rugo Stone, LLC,  No. 1:11-cv-00915-TSE-TCB (E.D. Va. 
Mar. 6, 2012) (Consent Decree); EEOC v. Applebee’s Neighborhood Bar & Grill, Case No. 1:02-
CV-00829-CAM (N.D. Ga. July 10, 2003) (Consent Decree). 
 316.  See Banks, supra note 9, at 1727. 
 317.  Id. 
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2.  Section 1981 
Section 1981 is derived from Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
which was reenacted by the Enforcement Act of 1870.318  Unlike the 1866 
Act, the reenacted version does not contain the words “race” or “color,” but 
rather states: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by 
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, pen-
alties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no 
other.319 
Section 1981 “lay largely dormant for nearly a century” but was revived dur-
ing the Civil Rights era, in the late 1960s.320 
Professor Banks notes that the initial Section 1981 color claims involved 
Latinx plaintiffs,321 probably because they did not fit neatly into existing ra-
cial categories,322 and because Section 1981, unlike Title VII, did not protect 
against national origin discrimination.323  In the 1977 case of Vigil v. City of 
Denver,324 the United States District Court for the District of Colorado upheld 
such a color claim, stating that “skin color may be a basis for discrimination” 
against Mexican Americans, even though skin color varied widely within the 
group.325  Professor Banks analyzes how courts disallowed other color claims 
by Latinx and Black plaintiffs,326 usually recognizing such claims only when 
the plaintiff’s race was ambiguous and color or ethnicity could serve as a 
substitute.327  According to Professor Banks, this served particularly to dis-
advantage Black plaintiffs.328  
                                                          
 318.  Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Im-
portance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 596 n.1 (1988) (noting that Section 1981’s 
“statutory ancestor” was the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
 319.  42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 320.  Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 318, at 596 n.1. 
 321.  Banks, supra note 9, at 1724–25. 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  Id. at 1725. 
 324.  No. 77-F-197, 1977 WL 41, at *1 (D. Colo. May 23, 1977). 
 325.  Id. at *1; see also Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng’g, Inc., 597 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 
1979) (finding that “prejudice towards those of Mexican descent having a skin color not character-
istically Caucasian must be said to be racial prejudice”). 
 326.  Banks, supra note 9, at 1727. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  See id. (citing Sere v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 628 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1986) 
(disallowing Section 1981 color discrimination claim by Nigerian plaintiff), abrogated by Jordan v. 
Whelan Sec. of Ill., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 746, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2014)); see also Waller v. Int’l Harvester 
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Nevertheless, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,329 the  Supreme 
Court noted that Section 1981 “reaches discrimination against an individual 
‘because he or she is genetically part of [a] . . . physiognomically distinctive 
sub-grouping of homo sapiens.’”330  In Jordan v. Whelan Security of Illinois, 
Inc.,331 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
cited Saint Francis College and recognized a Section 1981 color claim by a 
light-skinned African-American plaintiff.332  In doing so, the district court 
abrogated its own earlier rulings which had not recognized similar claims.333 
3.  Fair Housing Act 
In Rodriguez v. Gattuso,334 the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois recognized color discrimination under the Fair 
Housing Act335 and section 1982.336  The plaintiff, a dark-skinned Latino, 
sought to rent an apartment from the defendant, but after the two met, de-
fendant told him it was unavailable.  The plaintiff’s wife, who was a light-
skinned Latina, then met with the defendant, who told her the apartment was 
available.  However, upon learning that the plaintiff was her husband, the 
defendant recanted and again claimed that the apartment was unavailable.  
The Rodriguez court reasoned that “the very inclusion of ‘color’ as a separate 
term in addition to ‘race’”337 implied that color could be a separate, independ-
ent claim under the Fair Housing Act—even if “[m]ost often ‘race’ and 
‘color’ discrimination are viewed as synonymous.”338 
                                                          
Co., 578 F. Supp. 309, 314 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that “Section 1981 applies only to race dis-
crimination, not to discrimination on the basis of color”), abrogated by Jordan v. Whelan Sec. of 
Ill., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 746, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2014).   
 329.  481 U.S. 604 (1987). 
 330.  Id. at 613 (quoting Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 331.  30 F. Supp. 3d 746 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 332.  Id. at 753. 
 333.  See supra note 328. 
 334.  795 F. Supp 860, 864 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 335.  See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90–284, § 804, 82 Stat. 81, 83 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012)) (noting that it is unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent . . . 
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin . . . [t]o dis-
criminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling . . . 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”). 
 336.  42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). 
 337.  Rodriguez, 795 F. Supp. at 865. 
 338.  Id.; see also Walker v. Sec’y of the Treasury, IRS, 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 
953 F.2d 650 (11th Cir. 1992).  For further discussion of Walker, see supra text accompanying notes 
304–306. 
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C.  Separate but Not Equal 
Color discrimination claims under modern civil rights statutes differ 
from those in early equal protection claims in two basic ways.  First, modern 
color claims are separate: “color” means skin color, differentiated from race.  
However, although they have an independent identity, modern color claims 
are not on equal ground with race claims.  Rather, they become applicable 
only when race or national origin claims are not viable. 
All of the color claims under modern civil rights statutes have involved 
plaintiffs who belonged to one particular race-color subgroup (e.g., dark-
skinned African Americans).  However, a different type of color claim 
emerged from state equal protection in People v. Bridgeforth: a multiracial 
color class claim which involved a group of individuals of different races.  
The next Part examines Bridgeforth in depth. 
VI.  BRIDGING THE COLOR LINE 
With its 2016 ruling in People v. Bridgeforth,339 the New York Court of 
Appeals became the first court to recognize color discrimination as a viable 
basis for Batson challenges and the first court to recognize a multiracial color 
class—a protected class of individuals from different racial backgrounds 
based solely on the dark skin color of the members.340  Bridgeforth revived 
color in equal protection doctrine, albeit only under New York’s Constitu-
tion. 
This Part examines the Bridgeforth ruling, highlighting the novel recog-
nition of a multiracial color class.  It first reviews New York’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Civil Rights Law Section 13, which were the laws at play in 
Bridgeforth.  Next, it gives the factual background to Bridgeforth.  It then 
highlights the State’s argument against the  recognition of a multiracial color 
class and Bridgeforth’s argument for such recognition.  Finally, this Part ex-
amines the New York Court of Appeals ruling and its reasoning in siding 
with Bridgeforth. 
A.  New York’s Equal Protection Clause and Civil Rights Law 
Section 13 
New York previously adopted Batson’s doctrine for the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of its State Constitution.341  New York’s Equal Protection Clause 
reads: 
                                                          
 339.  69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016). 
 340.  Id. at 617. 
 341.  People v. Luciano, 890 N.E.2d 214, 216–17 (N.Y. 2008); see also People v. Kern, 554 
N.E.2d 1235, 1240–41 (N.Y. 1990). 
 
932 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:881 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this 
state or any subdivision thereof.  No person shall, because of race, 
color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his 
or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, 
or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the 
state.342 
New York Civil Rights Law section 13 also explicitly lists both “race” and 
“color” as a protected classes: 
No citizen of the state possessing all other qualifications which are 
or may be required or prescribed by law, shall be disqualified to 
serve as a grand or petit juror in any court of this state on account 
of race, creed, color, national origin or sex . . . .343 
Until Bridgeforth however, no case brought under these laws had focused on 
color. 
B.  Factual Background to People v. Bridgeforth 
Defendant-Appellant Joseph Bridgeforth (“Bridgeforth”) was a dark-
skinned African American who was charged with three counts of robbery344 
and convicted by a jury at trial.  During voir dire, the prosecutor used per-
emptory challenges to strike a number of jurors, including four dark-skinned 
African-American women345 and one dark-skinned woman of South Asian 
(Asian Indian) descent who the parties believed to be Guyanese.346  However, 
the prosecutor did not move to strike all prospective jurors who were African-
American or Guyanese.347  Bridgeforth raised a Batson challenge on grounds 
that dark-skinned women (both African-American and Guyanese-American) 
were being excluded.348  The prosecutor could not remember why he ex-
cluded the Guyanese South Asian juror and ultimately did not give a reason.  
However, he did argue that for the Batson class, defense counsel must “ei-
ther . . . do Guyanese or African American, [counsel] can’t do black or skin 
color.”349  The trial judge agreed, denied Bridgeforth’s Batson challenge, and 
allowed the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge.350  The dark-skinned South 
                                                          
 342.  N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 343.  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 2009).   
 344.  Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 615. 
 345.  Id. at 615. 
 346.  Id.  Approximately forty-four percent of the population of Guyana is of South Asian/Asian 
Indian descent.  See Guyana Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW, https://worldpopula-
tionreview.com/countries/guyana-population/ (last visited May 9, 2020).  The juror in question, 
however, was born in India.  Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 615. 
 347.  Id. at 619 (Garcia, J., concurring).  One of the African-American women was ultimately 
seated, but four of them, along with the one South-Asian woman were excused.  Id. at 620. 
 348.  Id. at 615 (majority opinion). 
 349.  Id. 
 350.  Id.   
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Asian juror was not seated.351  Bridgeforth was convicted and appealed the 
verdict, arguing that color is cognizable for Batson challenges under the New 
York Constitution and Civil Rights Law Section 13.352  After losing in the 
Appellate Division, Bridgeforth then appealed to the New York Court of Ap-
peals. 
C.  Recognition of a Multiracial Color Class 
The operant question in People v. Bridgeforth was whether a multiracial 
color class, composed of dark-skinned individuals from different racial back-
grounds, is cognizable and protected under Batson’s prohibition on juror ex-
clusion.353  Previously, such a class had not been recognized: Color claims 
under modern civil rights statutes had only involved plaintiffs representing 
one racial group.354  Bridgeforth was the first case in which a multiracial color 
class was recognized. 
1.  State’s Argument 
The People of the State of New York (“the State”) made various argu-
ments to dispute Bridgeforth’s claim that dark-skinned individuals are a cog-
nizable class.  The State’s main argument was that one cannot create a cog-
nizable class by “us[ing] a physical characteristic, by itself, to combine 
distinct groups into a single ‘super group’ for the purposes of Batson’s first 
step, the prima facie case.”355  It further contended that the group of dark-
skinned women proffered by Bridgeforth consisted of “women of widely dis-
parate backgrounds, national origins, or ethnicities, and different races.”356  
In contrast to Title VII color jurisprudence, where the courts have dismissed 
color claims when race and national origin claims have been available,357 the 
State here argued that the disparate race and national origin backgrounds of 
                                                          
 351.  Id. 
 352.  Id. at 616–17.   
 353.  New York has incorporated Batson into its state law.  See People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 
1240–41 (N.Y. 1990). 
 354.  The Second Circuit has held that Batson is applicable when jurors of different races are 
excluded because of their race.  See Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 298 (2d. Cir. 2005) (“It is indis-
putable that one venireperson cannot be excluded from a jury on account of race.  A fortiori, several 
venirepersons of different races cannot be excluded from a jury on account of race.”).  See also id. 
at 298 n.5 (citing cases which have allowed race-based Batson challenges based on exclusion of 
jurors of different races).  Nevertheless, these Batson challenges were not based on skin color. 
 355.  Respondent Reply Brief to Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Ctr. for Law and 
Equality at 4, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016) (No. 207) [hereinafter Respondent 
Reply to Amicus Brief]. 
 356.  Brief of Respondent at 44, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016) (No. 207) 
[hereinafter Brief of Respondent]. 
 357.  Banks, supra note 9, at 1727. 
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the class, which rendered those claims unavailable, also precluded color 
claims. 
The State argued that a cognizable group must be “a recognizable, dis-
tinct class . . . defined and limited by some clearly identifiable factor or fac-
tors.”358  The State cited New York Court of Appeals rulings that have re-
jected “people of color,”359 “non-whites,”360 “minorities,”361 and “individuals 
with ethnic backgrounds”362 as a cognizable classes, because these groups 
lack “internal cohesion” and defined common interests, attitudes, and other 
characteristics that can be classified together in a meaningful way.363  In ar-
guing that a color class would be similar, the State conceded that a single 
racial or ethnic group, such as African Americans, East Indians, or Guyanese 
could be a cognizable group.364  Nevertheless, the State argued that recogni-
tion of a group based on color alone “presents intractable skin tone line-draw-
ing problems.”365  Such a group would be subjective because light-skinned 
and dark-skinned are relative features rather than discrete groups, and indi-
viduals will disagree on whether a particular juror is light- or dark-skinned.366 
When responding to Bridgeforth’s contention that discrimination 
against dark-skinned individuals is rampant and has a long history, the State 
did not altogether deny the existence of colorism but rather pointed to lack of 
evidence of it in the record.367  Further, the State argued that the mere fact 
that a group faces discrimination or is disadvantaged does not make the group 
a cognizable class for Batson.368  It gave other examples of groups that may 
                                                          
 358.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 53 (first quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482, 494 (1977), then quoting Gray v. Brady, 592 F.3d 296, 305–06 (1st Cir. 2010)). 
 359.  Id. at 56 (citing Griffin v. Lewis, No. 2:11-CV-1358-JKS, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 146962, 
at *15 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012)).  Professor Kate Sablosky Elengold also criticizes the notion of 
“people of color” as a cognizable class in civil rights litigation.  See Elengold, supra note 9, at 1. 
 360.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 56 (citing United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 
645, 649 (9th Cir. 1982), overruled in part by United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154 
(9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Daly, 573 F. Supp. 788, 792 (N.D. Tex. 1983); United States v. 
Marcano, 508 F. Supp. 462, 469 (D.P.R. 1980)). 
 361.  Id. (citing People v. Smith, 613 N.E.2d 539, 540 (N.Y. 1993)). 
 362.  Id. (citing Griffin, No. 2:11-CV-1358-JKS, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 146962, at *14–15). 
 363.  Id. at 56–57.  But see supra note 354 (referencing federal cases where race-based Batson 
challenges involving jurors of different races were allowed). 
 364.  See Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 60 n.8. 
 365.  Respondent Reply to Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 8. 
 366.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 67–68. 
 367.  Id. at 5 (arguing that “[d]efendant did not show and cannot show that all ‘dark-colored’ 
woman [sic] . . . constitute a distinct, clearly-defined class . . . that has been singled out for discrim-
ination”).   
 368.  Respondent Reply to Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 6. 
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face discrimination but were not recognized as cognizable, such as “over-
weight individuals,”369 and “red-heads.”370  Moreover, the State argued that 
skin color is not “immutable”: Individuals’ skin color can change due to dis-
ease, sun exposure, use of skin lightening creams, and by other willful 
means.371  The State contended that because individuals can be “temporarily 
rendered a particular skin tone or color . . . . [there are] obvious prob-
lems . . .[in] . . .defining the group.”372 
Additionally, the State argued that the term “color” in the New York 
Constitution and Civil Rights Law section 13 is synonymous with race.373  It 
contended that courts analyzing Batson claims interpret terms like “black” to 
denote race rather than color, and that when “people of color” and “of color” 
are cognizable racial groups, these terms are referring to Black Americans or 
Latinx Americans, not to skin color.374 
But the state did not answer the operant question: Why then are there 
separate “race” and “color” protections in the New York’s Equal Protection 
Clause and Civil Rights Law section 13?375 
2.  Bridgeforth’s Argument 
Bridgeforth’s argument first highlighted the long history of colorism as 
discrimination against dark-skinned people.  This argument was buttressed 
by the amicus brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality 
and others in support of Bridgeforth, assisted by attorneys from Akin Gump 
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLC, which added more empirical support for discrim-
ination against dark-skinned people.376   
Bridgeforth also argued that skin color alone can form a cognizable 
class.  Responding to the State’s arguments, Bridgeforth noted that African 
Americans and women, both of whom are “indisputably cognizable 
class[es],” also have “widely varied interests, attitudes, ideas, cultural tradi-
tions, religious beliefs, and experiences.”377  Bridgeforth noted that “[t]he 
Supreme Court’s definition of a cognizable class is ‘a recognizable, distinct 
                                                          
 369.  Id.; Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 61. 
 370.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 50. 
 371.  Id. at 68–69. 
 372.  Id. at 66. 
 373.  Id. at 64–65.   
 374.  Id. at 63 (citing United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 2005) and 
United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 238–41 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 375.  See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 376.  See generally Respondent Reply to Amicus Brief, supra note 355. 
 377.  Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 10, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 
2016) (No. 207) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant]. 
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class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, written or as ap-
plied.’”378  Further, even if a “common thread” was required to recognize a 
cognizable class, Bridgeforth argued that “being the target of color-based dis-
crimination is a powerful collective experience that transcends individual 
ethnic groups.”379 
Additionally, Bridgeforth argued that Batson challenges are based on 
visual discernment of race and thus truly based on color: “Batson challenges 
are often based on lawyers’ and judges’ assumptions about prospective ju-
rors’ races (as in this case), [and] parties and/or the court can disagree about 
group membership, which can devolve into an extremely subjective determi-
nation by the court.”380  Bridgeforth pointed to two New York cases: (1) Peo-
ple v. Chery, where the trial court did not move past Batson Step 1 because 
one of two prospective jurors identified as “Black” did not appear to be “an 
individual of African descent”;381 and (2) People v. Chance,382 where the trial 
court did not believe that some jurors were African-American because their 
skin color was “very light” and they “could ‘pass for White.’”383  Citing these, 
Bridgeforth contended that “courts already resort to skin color to determine 
whether jurors belong to a group that is the subject of a race-based Batson 
challenge.”384 
Bridgeforth’s counsel, Ms. Tammy E. Linn, reiterated this point at oral 
argument.  When pressed by Judge Eugene M. Fahey that color is “not part 
of the normal calculus in the Batson analysis,” Ms. Linn replied: “[C]olor is, 
in general, used as a proxy for race in the normal race-based Batson chal-
lenge. . . . it’s part of the calculus that’s already applied. . . if you think about 
jury selection, jurors aren’t being asked what race they are.”385  Ms. Linn 
further asserted that “federal courts are using color as well. . . . this is how 
race-based challenges have been . . . applied.”386 
                                                          
 378.  Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)). 
 379.  Id. at 14. 
 380.  Id. at 19. 
 381.  Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 377, at 19. 
 382.  5 N.Y.S.3d 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
 383.  Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 377, at 20. 
 384.  Id. 
 385.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016) (No. 
207). 
 386.  Id. at 5–6.  This argument harks back to the early jury service cases under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause: Race discrimination against prospective jurors is occurring 
“because of their color.”  See supra Part III.A.1–2.  But see supra note 171 (noting that in nineteenth-
century jury cases, it is not clear whether jurors were actually excluded by visual examination of 
their skin color). 
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D.  New York Court of Appeals Opinion 
In a unanimous opinion387 authored by the late Justice Sheila Abdus-
Salaam,388 the New York Court of Appeals held that color is cognizable for 
Batson challenges.389  The Court granted Bridgeforth a new trial and offered 
five reasons for its holding. 
The first reason was textual: “race” and “color” are separately enumer-
ated in the New York Constitution and section 13 of the Civil Rights Law, 
and this “indicates that ‘color’ is a distinct classification from ‘race.’”390  Sec-
ond, the Court acknowledged the long history of colorism, noting that “[d]is-
crimination on the basis of one’s skin color—or colorism—has been well 
researched and analyzed.”391  To support this proposition, the Court cited 
scholarly works by Professors Taunya Lovell Banks, Trina Jones, and Mi-
chael Hughes and Bradley R. Hertel.392  Third, the Court noted the im-
portance of jury service, which it deemed “a principal means of participation 
in government . . . [and] an instrument of public justice.”393  Fourth, the Court 
distinguished color classes from “‘minorities’ in general.”394  It described 
“minorities” as “a category that includes a vast and varied group . . . that is 
subject to change based on census and other demographic data.”395  In con-
trast, the Court found that “[s]kin color is generally an immutable character-
istic” that requires a much narrower showing to establish discrimination.396  
Finally, the Court addressed subjectivity and administrability of color 
                                                          
 387.  69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016).  Justice Michael Garcia concurred on separate grounds and 
did not agree with the Court that color should be cognizable for Batson.  See id. at 620 (Garcia, J., 
concurring) (“[T]o hold that ‘skin color’ is a cognizable class for purposes of Batson. . . . [is] a 
monumental ruling [that] should occur only after careful consideration . . . .”); see also infra note 
424. 
 388.  Sadly, less than four months after issuing the Bridgeforth decision, Justice Abdus-Salaam 
passed away.  See Mike Hayes, The Life and Tragic Death of the First Black Female Judge on New 
York’s Highest Court, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Apr. 14, 2017, 6:57 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikehayes/the-life-and-tragic-death-of-sheila-abdus-sa-
laam. 
 389.  Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 613–615. 
 390.  Id. at 614 (“The separation of ‘race’ and ‘color’ in the [New York Constitution’s Equal 
Protection] Clause indicates that ‘color’ is a distinct classification from ‘race.’  Similarly, section 
13 of [New York’s] Civil Rights Law . . . lists ‘race’ and ‘color’ as distinct classes. . . . indicat[ing] 
that ‘color’ is a separate and distinct classification from ‘race.’”). 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  Id.; see supra notes 9, 87 for the specific works cited.  These works were referred to the 
Court by the Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al.  Brief 
for Amici Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. in Support of Defendant-
Appellant, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016) (No. 2012-07683). 
 393.  Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 614. 
 394.  Id. at 615.  
 395.  Id. 
 396.  Id. 
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claims.397  It stated that trial courts can use the existing protocol for Batson 
challenges to determine whether a particular group of individuals constitutes 
a cognizable color class—whether they “share a similar skin color”398—in 
the same manner that such determinations are made for race, ethnicity, gen-
der, and other classifications.399 
People v. Bridgeforth is the first modern equal protection case to recog-
nize color discrimination, and the first equal protection case in any era to 
recognize it as separate from race discrimination.  It is also the first case un-
der any civil rights law to recognize a cognizable class made up of individuals 
of different races, linked solely by their skin color.  Although limited to Bat-
son challenges and to the State of New York, it opens up a conversation about 
the future of color-based anti-discrimination law—an area with growing po-
tential as America becomes more multiracial and racially fluid.  As the next 
Part lays out, Bridgeforth’s recognition of a cognizable, multiracial color 
class can have significant implications for civil rights law. 
VII.  GIVING “COLOR” TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 
As shown in Figure 2, People v. Bridgeforth bridges the gap between 
Reconstruction Era laws and modern civil rights laws and expands the pro-
tections they provide against color discrimination.  It separates skin color 
from race, but not by limiting it to racial subclasses (e.g., dark-skinned Afri-
can Americans).  Rather, Bridgeforth allows discrimination based on skin 
color to create a much larger protected class—one that transcends formal ra-
cial categories and can address discrimination more broadly. 
 
Figure 2: Types of Color Discrimination Claims 
Cause of Action Protected Class 
14th Amendment –  
Equal Protection Clause 
Racial Group  
(e.g., African Americans) 
Modern Civil Rights Statutes  
(e.g., Title VII) 
Racial Subgroup (e.g., dark-
skinned African Americans) 
New York’s Equal Protection 
Clause § 13 (People v. Bridgeforth) 
Multiracial Group (e.g., dark-
skinned people of different races) 
 
Multiracial color classes such as the one recognized in Bridgeforth can 
be important in the future, as the American population becomes more racially 
diverse and fluid and as discrimination crosses racial lines.  Developing a 
broader color-based anti-discrimination jurisprudence will add a valuable 
                                                          
 397.  Id. 
 398.  Id. 
 399.  Id.  
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facet to civil rights law.  To do so, civil rights advocates will need to develop 
ways to collect data on color discrimination and develop legal strategies to 
address it.  This Part considers ways to accomplish that end. 
A.  America’s Changing Color Line 
As the twenty-first century progresses, colorism and racism will inter-
sect even more.  America’s racial demographics are changing: Professor Wil-
liam Frey notes that for the first time in 2011, more children of color were 
born in the United States than White children.400  Professor Frey and many 
others forecast that the United States will become a majority-minority nation 
by the middle of the twenty-first century.401  Latinx and Asian Americans, 
along with people of mixed race, continue to add more variation to the color 
line—including variation in skin color.  Consequently, Professor Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva argues that colorism will become an even more significant as-
pect of American social hierarchy.402 
Additionally, racial classifications continue to be malleable.  Census ra-
cial categories have always evolved over time,403 and people from different 
nationalities may experience changes in racial classification over their own 
                                                          
 400.  WILLIAM H. FREY, DIVERSITY EXPLOSION: HOW NEW RACIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ARE 
REMAKING AMERICA 1 (2015). 
 401.  Id. at 1.  See also DALE MAHARIDGE, THE COMING WHITE MINORITY: CALIFORNIA, 
MULTICULTURALISM, AND AMERICA’S FUTURE (1996); SARAH CARR, SANDRA L. COLBY & 
JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE U.S. POPULATION: 
2014 TO 2060 (2015), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publica-
tions/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf; William H. Frey, The US Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, 
Census Projects, BROOKINGS INST.: THE AVENUE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in-2045-census-pro-
jects/.  But see Jonathan W. Warren & France Winndance Twine, White Americans, the New Mi-
nority? Non-Blacks and the Ever-Expanding Boundaries of Whiteness, 28 J. BLACK STUD. 200, 202 
(1997) (arguing that projections of majority-minority America are based on assumption that ‘White’ 
is fixed category and ignore pattern of assimilation of many American immigrant groups, who grad-
ually position themselves as ‘White’ and distance themselves Black Americans).   
 402.  See Bonilla-Silva, supra note 69, at 5 (arguing that “color gradations [in the U.S.] . . . will 
become more salient factors of stratification”); see also Harris, supra note 9, at 54 (noting “the 
possible effects on society and anti-discrimination law of a drift away from ancestry as an important 
component of assigned race and towards a greater focus on color”).  Professor Bonilla-Silva argues 
that U.S. social hierarchy will come to resemble the color-based hierarchy in Latin American na-
tions.  See Bonilla-Silva, supra note 69, at 4.  But see Christina Sue, An Assessment of the Latin 
Americanization Thesis, 32 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1058, 1062 (2009) (noting that “some recent 
evidence for both Mexican Americans and African Americans suggests that skin colour in the US 
may actually be decreasing in significance”).  Professor Sue’s contention here refers to specific 
within-group color hierarchies, not the multiracial color hierarchy posited by Professor Bonilla-
Silva.  For an overview of race and color hierarchies in Latin America, see Hernandez, supra note 
80. 
 403.  See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text. 
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lifetimes.404  The 2000 and 2010 Censuses allowed multiracial identifica-
tion.405  Increasing numbers of people are identifying with more than one 
race,406 and this makes it more difficult to track race discrimination.407 
Individual racial identity itself is becoming more fluid.  Growing num-
bers of racially ambiguous people do not fit neatly into existing categories.408  
Individuals are even changing their own racial identities.409  Professor Car-
olyn Liebler and her colleagues find that almost 10 million Americans 
changed their racial self-identification between the 2000 and 2010 Cen-
suses.410  These researchers also highlight the complexity of this pattern: 
“People who change their race . . . are doing so in a wide variety of ways . . . . 
[their] responses change from multiple races to a single race, from a single 
race to multiple races, and from one single race to another.”411  Others have 
advocated eliminating racial classification and identification altogether,412 
                                                          
 404.  See Harpalani, supra note 85, at 135–36 (noting how U.S. Census racial classification of 
Asian Indian Americans changed from “Hindu” in 1960 to “White” in 1970 to “Asian Indian” in 
1980). 
 405.  NICHOLAS A. JONES & JUNGMIWHA BULLOCK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE TWO OR 
MORE RACES POPULATION: 2010 1 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-
13.pdf. 
 406.  Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Rich Morin & Mark Hugo Lopez, Multiracial in 
America: Proud, Diverse and Growing in Numbers, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2015), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/06/11/multiracial-in-america/. 
 407.  See TANYA KATERÍ HERNÁNDEZ, MULTIRACIALS AND CIVIL RIGHTS MIXED-RACE 
STORIES OF DISCRIMINATION (2018); NATALIE MASUOKA, MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY AND RACIAL 
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (2017); Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Multiracial” Discourse: Ra-
cial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97 (1998); Lauren 
Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity with Equal Protection, 102 CAL. 
L. REV. 1243 (2014). 
 408.  See generally Harpalani, supra note 68. 
 409.  See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Affirmative Action in the Era of Elective Race: Racial Com-
modification and the Promise of New Functionalism, 102 GEO. L.J. 179 (2013); Nancy Leong, Iden-
tity Entrepreneurs, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1333, 1335–36 (2016) (describing a student who identifies as 
Native American on application based on one distant Native American ancestor as an “identity en-
trepreneur—someone who leverages his or her identity as a means of deriving social or economic 
value”); Charles M. Blow, The Delusions of Rachel Dolezal, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/opinion/charles-blow-the-delusions-of-dolezal.html (noting 
how the story of a woman who was born White but later began identifying herself as Black “has 
sparked a national conversation about how race is constructed and enforced, to what extent it is 
cultural and experiential, and whether it is mutable and adoptable”). 
 410.  See Carolyn Liebler et al., America’s Churning Races: Race and Ethnic Response Changes 
Between Census 2000 and the 2010 Census, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 259 (2017); see also Carolyn Liebler, 
et al., America’s Churning Races: Race and Ethnic Response Changes Between Census 2000 and 
the 2010 Census (Center for Admin. Records Research and Applications, Working Paper No. 2014-
09, 2014) [hereinafter Carolyn Liebler, et. al., Working Paper]. 
 411.  Carolyn Liebler, et. al., Working Paper, supra note 410, at 39.  
 412.  See, e.g., Complaint at 119, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 1:14-cv-14176-DJC) (seeking “permanent 
injunction requiring Harvard to conduct all admissions in a manner that does not permit those en-
gaged in the decisional process to be aware of or learn the race or ethnicity of any applicant for 
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which could also thwart attempts to collect and analyze data on race discrim-
ination.413 
In this context, formal racial categories can become less relevant, and 
tangible characteristics such as skin color and other physical features can be-
come more central to discrimination.  A formalist approach to antidiscrimi-
nation law, emphasizing government racial classifications, fails to capture 
many discriminatory acts and policies.  To protect civil rights, advocates will 
need to think about protected classes in a broader, more flexible manner: one 
that matches the changing demographics of American society, and one that 
captures everyday mechanisms of discrimination such as visual identification 
by skin color.  Bridgeforth’s multiracial color class can open the door for 
civil rights advocates to do so. 
B.  “Darker than a Latte” 
The advent of a racially ambiguous U.S. landscape means that discrim-
ination will take new forms.  In July 2018, Republican strategist Rick Wilson 
commented that President Donald Trump’s core supporters wanted to deport 
anyone who was “darker than a latte.”414  Wilson’s comment portends how 
animus and discrimination may play out in twenty-first-century America—
sometimes without any formal classification of race. 
At times, racist rhetoric and policies are themselves transcending formal 
racial categories.  President Trump’s stark appeals to xenophobia have tar-
geted a variety of groups—ranging from Muslims from various Middle East-
ern and African countries to Mexican Americans and other Latinx Ameri-
cans.415  President Trump has scapegoated these groups to promote his 
                                                          
admission”); KENNETH PREWITT, WHAT IS “YOUR” RACE? THE CENSUS AND OUR FLAWED 
EFFORTS TO CLASSIFY AMERICANS (2013) (arguing that questions about race should eventually be 
eliminated from U.S. Census).  But see Elise Boddie, A Damaging Bid to Censor Applications at 
Harvard, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/opinion/harvard-af-
firmative-action-lawsuit.html (arguing that “bar[ring] colleges from being able to consider, learn 
about or even become aware of an applicant’s race . . . . denies all of us chances to build bridges 
across communities and to understand the lived realities of race in America”).  
 413.  Even if the Census and other government agencies continue to collect race data, individuals 
may choose not to identify by race, which would make race discrimination and racial inequality 
more difficult to track. 
 414.  Greg Price, Donald Trump’s Supporters “Want Anybody Darker Than a Latte Deported,” 
Claims Republican Strategist, NEWSWEEK (July 11, 2018, 12:16 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-supporters-darker-latte-1018600.  
 415.  See Erika Lee, Trump’s Xenophobia Is an American Tradition—But It Doesn’t Have to Be, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/out-
look/2019/11/26/trumps-xenophobia-is-an-american-tradition-it-doesnt-have-be/ (“Trump may be 
the most xenophobic American leader in United States history.  From the effort to restrict immi-
grants from mostly Muslim countries and the drastic reduction in refugee admissions, to efforts to 
build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border and the denial of asylum seekers from Central America, 
Trump’s policies have transformed immigration to the United States.”).  Most recently, Trump has 
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administration’s policies on immigration and national security.  Members of 
each of these groups may vary in their racial or national origin classifications, 
and sometimes the government jointly classifies them with other groups that 
are not targeted.  Latinx can self-identify as “White” or “Black,” as the Cen-
sus asks a separate question about “Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin.”416 
With all of these groups, various forms of discrimination can transcend 
formal racial classification.  Skin color and other physical features can often 
be a means to identify members of these groups and distinguish them from 
White Americans of European descent.  If law enforcement officials target 
these groups by discrimination based on appearance, color-based protections 
could be a valuable tool to address such discrimination. 
Racial profiling of Black men by police officers, a practice with long 
historical roots,417 provides another example where color-based protections 
may be useful under certain circumstances.  Such profiling often involves 
identifying race via skin color, in a manner similar to the peremptory chal-
lenges in Bridgeforth.  If police officers target Black males, the officers typ-
ically identify who is Black through visible features, including skin color.  
The officers do not know if these men self-identify as “Black” and do not 
have information about their ancestry.  In the absence of other social or visual 
cues to identify race, police officers may be less likely to target very light-
skinned Black people who can “pass” for White.  Police officers may also 
target dark-skinned people who are not Black but are perceived as Black.  
Once such case that garnered national attention occurred in 2015 in Madison, 
Alabama.418  Police officers beat and severely injured Sureshbhai Patel, a 
                                                          
scapegoated Asian Americans over the spread of novel coronavirus pandemic.  See Ted Lieu, Ted 
Lieu: Trump Is Stoking Xenophobic Panic in a Time of Crisis, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2020, 6:48 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ted-lieu-trump-is-stoking-xenophobic-panic-in-a-
time-of-crisis/2020/03/18/91433600-6959-11ea-b313-df458622c2cc_story.html (“Trump’s re-
peated insistence on calling coronavirus the ‘Chinese virus’ is more than just xenophobic; it causes 
harm both to Asian Americans and to the White House’s response to this life-threatening pan-
demic.”). 
 416.  2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_dec-
ades/index_of_questions/2010.html (last visited May 10, 2020).  For the 2020 Census, the Census 
Bureau considered adding a separate racial category for Latinx, but this was ultimately rejected.  
See Hansi Lo Wang, 2020 Census To Keep Racial, Ethnic Categories Used In 2010, NPR (Jan. 26, 
2018, 7:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/26/580865378/census-request-suggests-no-race-
ethnicity-data-changes-in-2020-experts-say.  Professor Tanya Katerí Hernández argues that sepa-
rate Latinx racial category would reduce the number of Latinx who identify as “Black” and thus 
undermine data collection on racism.  See Tanya Katerí Hernández, Latino Anti-Black Bias and the 
Census Categorization of Latinos, NEWMAN FERRARA LLP (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.nyreales-
tatelawblog.com/manhattan-litigation-blog/2017/december/latino-anti-black-bias-/.  This under-
scores the importance of tracking skin color discrimination separately.  See infra Part VII.C.2. 
 417.  See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ET AL., POLICING THE BLACK MAN (2018). 
 418.  See Peter Holley, Abby Phillip & Abby Ohlheiser, Alabama Police Officer Arrested After 
Indian Grandfather Left Partially Paralyzed, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2015, 7:19 AM), 
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fifty-seven-year-old Asian Indian immigrant grandfather who had only been 
in the United States for one week, after a suspicious caller identified him as 
“a skinny [B]lack guy.”419 
In this vein, the absence of color-based protections could enable racial 
discrimination by proxy—on the basis of skin color.  If color is not a pro-
tected class, prosecutors like the one in Bridgeforth and police officers such 
as those in the Patel case could use skin color to effectively discriminate by 
race.  Addressing these and other issues of color discrimination will be diffi-
cult, given the current legal and political climate in America.420  Neverthe-
less, the final two Sections propose ways to begin this process. 
C.  Measuring the Color Line 
The collection of data on skin color discrimination is a key first step for 
civil rights advocates.421  Measurement and analysis of color discrimination 
presents many challenges.  Since Bridgeforth became law in New York, 
                                                          
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/02/11/alabama-cops-leave-a-grand-
father-partially-paralyzed-after-frisk-goes-awry/.  
 419.  Id.  The Patel case also illustrates the continuing significance of Black-White racial hier-
archy in many circumstances, as Patel was profiled because he was perceived as Black.  See 
Harpalani, supra note 85, at 182 (“W]hile the demographics and dynamics of racialization in Amer-
ica have become increasingly complex, the black-white paradigm of American race relations still 
has salience, even for groups who do not fit into ‘black’ or ‘white’ formal categories.”).   
 420.  See Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Handed Down a Unanimous Decision That Bodes 
Ill for the Future of Civil Rights, VOX (Mar. 25, 2020, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2020/3/25/21192320/supreme-court-comcast-decision-civil-rights-mixed-
motive-lawsuits (“[The] future bodes ill for anyone who cares about victims of discrimination.”). 
 421.  The EEOC has listed data collection and analysis as a main goal of its Eradicating Racism 
and Colorism from Employment (E-RACE) Initiative.  See E-RACE Goals and Objectives, U.S. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-
race/goals.cfm#goal3 (last visited May 10, 2020).  
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questions have been raised about the administrability of color discrimination 
claims.422  As stated in People v. Ortega:423 
The difficulties . . . in assessing skin color . . . will be of a different 
character than . . . race or ethnicity.  With race or ethnicity . . . it 
may be difficult in some cases to discern whether a juror is African-
American or Hispanic.  But there are at least agreed-upon ques-
tions.  The issue of whether someone has a sufficiently dark (or 
light) skin color . . . may not be so simple.424 
Ortega further noted that “courts may need new tools and training to ade-
quately address such issues. . . . To fulfill the aspirations of Bridgeforth, we 
may all need to think in new ways.”425 
Administrability concerns about skin color arise in part from a lack of 
formal categories.  Unlike race, skin color is not formally classified by the 
government.426  U.S. Census forms once included “color or race” categories 
determined by enumerators,427 but the Census now uses self-identification of 
race.428  There are no formal government skin color categories such as “light-
skinned” and “dark-skinned”: These terms reflect only subjective informal 
assessments that vary among individuals.  Consequently, there is much less 
                                                          
 422.  See People v. Ortega, 62 N.Y.S.3d 879, 880 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (“The rationale for the 
Bridgeforth decision is compelling.  How trial courts will be able to practically assess whether a 
party is discriminating . . . by virtue of ‘similar skin color, for example, dark-colored’ is less clear.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611, 615 (N.Y. 2016)).  The Ortega 
court held that: 
[A] class . . . [which] consisted of persons of African American, Hispanic or Middle East-
ern decent [sic], with the possible additional qualification that such persons had skin tones 
darker than a Caucasian and the additional provisos that the class likely included Indians 
(but not Asians) and that persons of Middle Eastern descent were African. . . . does not 
constitute a cognizable class under Batson.   
Id. at 884.  Conversely, the appellate court in People v. Pescara affirmed Bridgeforth’s recognition 
of skin color for Batson challenges.  79 N.Y.S.3d 827, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).  This case in-
volved peremptory strike of a dark-skinned juror (described as “black”) whose race was disputed: 
The defense claimed he was “African American” and the prosecutor claimed he was “Caribbean.”  
Id.   
 423.  62 N.Y.S.3d 879 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). 
 424.  Id. at 886; see also Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 621 (Garcia, J., concurring) (“[T]he only 
‘guidance’ offered to trial courts is that they should somehow ‘decide whether the individuals iden-
tified . . . share a similar skin color’ . . . [which] supplies little concrete or practical instruction for 
lower courts tasked with creating a record that allows for meaningful appellate review.” (quoting 
id. at 615 (majority opinion))).   
 425.  Ortega, 62 N.Y.S.3d at 886.  Another aspect about skin color discrimination claims that 
may have implications for enforcement is whether a judge or jury decides if there has been discrim-
ination.  For Batson challenges, it is the former; however, for Title VII and other statutory claims, 
it would be the latter if a case goes to trial. 
 426.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 427.  See supra notes 24–36.  Even when the Census collected “color” data, this did not corre-
spond to skin color itself, but rather to race.  See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text. 
 428.  See Index of Questions, supra note 30. 
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data on skin color discrimination than on race discrimination.429  Such data 
exist only when social science studies have collected them.430 
Most social science studies of colorism to date have used subjective rat-
ings by researchers to determine skin color.431  These ratings have been based 
on options such as “light,” “medium,” and “dark.” 432  Some studies have also 
included self ratings of skin color by subjects.433  Concerns echoed by the 
Ortega Court434 also resonate in these studies.  Many of them did not provide 
a baseline visual inventory of skin color for the raters to use as a reference 
point.435  Also, these studies generally have not reported how reliable and 
consistent these ratings are across different raters.436  There is evidence that 
biases affect subjective assessments of skin color.437  Even when there is a 
visual skin color inventory as a reference point, researcher ratings of skin 
color may be unreliable.438 
                                                          
 429.  See Bonilla-Silva, supra note 86, at 5 (noting that “there is no data set that includes sys-
tematic data on the skin tone of all Americans”).   
 430.  See supra notes 87–91. 
 431.  See, e.g., Goldsmith, Hamilton & Darity, supra note 89; Hughes & Hertel, supra note 87; 
Keith & Herring, supra note 90. 
 432.  See supra note 431.   
 433.  See, e.g., Fegley et al., supra note 10; Monk, Costs of Skin Color, supra note 91. 
 434.  See supra note 424 and accompanying text. 
 435.  See, e.g., supra note 431.  One such visual inventory that has been used recently is the 
Massey-Martin Scale.  See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & JENNIFER A. MARTIN, NEW IMMIGRANT 
SURVEY SKIN COLOR SCALE (2003), https://nis.princeton.edu/downloads/nis-skin-color-scale.pdf.  
This scale has been used in General Social Survey’s 2010-14 panel.  See Lance Hannon & Robert 
Defina, Reliability Concerns in Measuring Respondent Skin Tone by Interviewer Observation, 80 
PUB. OPINION Q. 534, 534 (2016) [hereinafter Hannon & Defina, Reliability Concerns].  The 2012 
and 2016 American National Election Studies time series data collections also used the Massey-
Martin Scale.  See Lance Hannon & Robert Defina, The Reliability of Same‑Race and Cross‑Race 
Skin Tone Judgments, RACE & SOC. PROBS. (Feb. 14, 2020), https://link.springer.com/arti-
cle/10.1007%2Fs12552-020-09282-4#citeas [hereinafter Hannon & Defina, Skin Tone Judge-
ments].  Another visual inventory for assessing skin color is described by Dr. Fegley and her co-
authors.  Fegley et al., supra note 10, at 297 (discussing the Visual Inventory for Skin Color As-
sessment (“VISTA”): “a commercially produced, glossy-finished, 15-inch color bar . . . comprised 
of 10 colors arrayed across the bar from lightest to darkest. . . . selected . . . from a wide range of 
human skin-tone colors”). 
 436.  See supra notes 87–91.  An exception here is Professors Shervin Assari and Cleopatra 
Howard Caldwell, who report that in their study, self-ratings and interviewer ratings of skin color 
had a correlation of 0.8.  Shervin Assari & Cleopatra Howard Caldwell, Darker Skin Tone Increases 
Perceived Discrimination Among Male but Not Female Caribbean Black Youth, 4 CHILD. 107, 110 
(2017).  Additionally, Professor Uzogara et al.’s study reports discrepancies between interviewer-
rated and self-rated skin tones.  Uzogara et al., supra note 45, at 208–209.  
 437.  See Denia Garcia & Maria Abascal, Colored Perceptions Racially Distinctive Names and 
Assessments of Skin Color, 60 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 420, 420 (2016) (finding that “skin color ratings 
are affected by the presence of a racially distinctive name: A significant share of people will rate 
the same face darker when that face is assigned a distinctively Hispanic name as opposed to a non-
Hispanic name.”). 
 438.  See Hannon & Defina, Reliability Concerns, supra note 435, at 534 (“Despite the wide-
spread use of the Massey-Martin scale to investigate potential effects of skin tone on social attitudes 
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More objective data on skin color discrimination may also be collected 
via photographs,439 and some studies of race and color bias in criminal sen-
tencing have employed this method.440  Additionally, quantitative measure-
ments of skin color can be conducted with a spectrophotometer, which can 
measure wavelengths of light reflected from skin.441  Various studies of col-
orism and skin color bias have used these as well.442 
                                                          
and outcomes, the data suggest that the measure has low intercoder reliability.”); Hannon & Defina, 
Skin Tone Judgments, supra note 435 (“We strongly recommend that researchers and survey organ-
izations seek alternate measurements of respondent skin tone that do not rely on humans memoriz-
ing subtle variations in color.  In theory, the strategy of having respondents self-rate with an 
abridged color guide is a straightforward alternative, but evidence on the reliability of self-ratings 
is currently lacking.”). 
 439.  Cf. People v. Ortega, 62 N.Y.S.3d 879, 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (“No one has proposed, 
for example, that photographs be taken when skin color Batson challenges are made.”). 
 440.  See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhart et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of 
Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 384 (2006) (using 
photographs of Black capital defendants in study of bias based on “stereotypicality of . . . Black 
defendant’s appearance . . . [based on] features [such as] . . . lips, nose, hair texture, [and] skin 
tone”).  Professor Eberhart et al. found that “the more stereotypically Black a defendant is perceived 
to be, the more likely that person is to be sentenced to death” in a mock sentencing experiment.  Id. 
at 383.  Other studies have yielded similar findings.  See Mark W. Bennett & Victoria C. Plaut, 
Looking Criminal and the Presumption of Dangerousness: Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone, 
and Criminal Justice, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745, 775–85 (2018) (reviewing empirical studies of 
relationship between dark skin tone, Afrocentric facial features, and length of criminal sentences); 
Irene Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 674, 677 (2004) (finding relationship between more Afrocentric features and longer criminal 
sentences).  Some studies have found that darker skin is associated with harsher punishment even 
for White defendants.  See, e.g., Ryan D. King & Brian D. Johnson, A Punishing Look: Skin Tone 
and Afrocentric Features in the Halls of Justice, 122 AM. J. SOC. 90, 90 (2016) (finding that “darker 
skin tone and Afrocentric facial features are associated with harsher [criminal] sanctions and that 
the latter effect is particularly salient for white defendants”). 
 441.  See Edward A. Edwards & S. Quimby Duntley, The Pigments and Color of Living Human 
Skin, 65 AM. J. ANATOMY 1 (1939); ELLI ANGELOPOULOU, THE REFLECTANCE SPECTRUM OF 
HUMAN SKIN TONE (Univ. of Pa. Dep’t of Comput. and Info. Sci. Technical Report No. MS-CIS-
99-29, 1999).  
In the cosmetics industry, spectrophotometers have been used to measure skin color, for the 
purpose of matching it with makeup.  See Marissa A., Spectrophotometers Help Cosmetic Brands 
Create More Diverse Foundation Shades, HUNTERLAB (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.hun-
terlab.com/blog/color-pharmaceuticals/spectrophotometers-help-cosmetic-brands-create-more-di-
verse-foundation-shades/; EasyMatchQC, HUNTERLAB, https://www.hunterlab.com/easymatch-
qc.html (last visited May 11, 2020).  Relatedly, Dr. Thomas Fitzpatrick developed the Fitzpatrick 
Scale to measure the amount of melanin in skin after exposure to sunlight.  See The Fitzpatrick 
Scale, DERMA HEALTH SKIN & LASER (Nov. 2, 2017), https://dermahealthinstitute.com/blog/the-
fitzpatrick-scale/.  The Fitzpatrick Scale is not a measure of skin color per se, but rather of “skin’s 
reactivity to the sun when exposed.”  Id. 
 442.  See, e.g., Branigan et al., Skin Color, Sex, and Educational Attainment, supra note 88; 
Branigan et al., Shifting Salience of Skin Color, supra note 88; Branigan et al., supra note 91; Sweet 
et al., supra note 90; Mara Ostfeld & Nicole Yadon, Mejorando La Raza?: The Political Undertones 
of Latinos’ Skin Color in the U.S. (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Nicole Yadon & 
Mara Ostfeld, Shades of Privilege: The Relationship Between Skin Color and Political Attitudes 
Among White Americans (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  But see Monk, 
Cost of Skin Color, supra note 91, at 409 (“Many studies use spectrophotometers to ‘objectively’ 
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If these methods can be used reliably and efficiently to collect data, they 
could prove useful for assessing color discrimination on a large scale.  Data 
on colorism will be necessary in the creation of multiracial color classes, 
which by definition require aggregation of discriminatory acts against multi-
ple individuals.  It is only with such data that civil rights advocates can ex-
pand the scope of color-based antidiscrimination law. 
D.  Erasing the Color Line 
Once there is sufficient data on color discrimination, the major chal-
lenge will be the incorporation of protected multiracial color classes into ex-
isting legal frameworks or new frameworks.  Civil rights advocates will need 
to develop innovative legal strategies to bring forth multiracial color class 
claims.  This will be a long, arduous task—but if successful, it would parallel 
some of the most significant civil rights victories in America.443 
Two challenges that civil rights advocates will confront are devising le-
gal frameworks to further develop color discrimination law and finding ven-
ues to bring cases to develop that law.  Implicit bias is one area to explore for 
the former, and state civil rights law could be a guide for the latter. 
1.  Potential Legal Frameworks 
By combining data on skin color discrimination and state civil rights 
law, advocates may be able to draw upon and expand existing legal frame-
works to address skin color discrimination.  Statistical analyses with large 
data sets could help drive pattern-or-practice cases, similar to those that have 
been used in Title VII employment discrimination claims.444  Additionally, 
statistical evidence can give rise to disparate impact claims under Title VII.445  
Data on color discrimination could allow claims to be brought under Title 
VII itself, or under state civil rights laws which use pattern-or-practice or 
disparate impact claims as models. 
                                                          
measure respondents’ skin tone.  In these studies, researchers typically measure the skin reflectance 
of respondents’ inner arms. . . . As research demonstrates, however, social classification . . . and 
ethnoracial discrimination related to skin tone, in particular, are both related to the perception of the 
lightness or darkness of faces, not inner arms (which, due to differential exposure to the sun, among 
other factors, may not even be the same shade as individuals’ faces).” (citations omitted)). 
 443.  See supra note 217; see infra notes 467–468.  Of course, even such victories are far from 
complete.  See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE (1989); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE 
OF RACISM (1992). 
 444.  See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977).  Pattern-or-practice claims are 
also available under other modern civil rights laws.  See generally A Pattern or Practice of Discrim-
ination, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/pattern-or-practice-dis-
crimination.  
 445.  See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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Following Bridgeforth’s lead, Batson challenges may also be the best 
venue to expand the recognition of protected color classes in the realm of 
equal protection.  Bridgeforth did not require any data collection:446 The case 
emerged from a specific pattern of juror exclusion.  While such patterns may 
be uncommon, Bridgeforth does provide persuasive authority for other state 
courts when similar fact patterns do arise.447  Moreover, if color-based pro-
tections are recognized for Batson, it follows logically that they should be 
recognized for equal protection more generally.  A sympathetic court might 
extend color-based anti-discrimination to other areas, based on Bridgeforth 
and other states that follow the decision. 
Nevertheless, color-based equal protection will have to grapple with 
some of the same doctrinal constraints that have impeded race-based equal 
protection.  A major hurdle has been proof of intent to discriminate—a re-
quirement for equal protection claims,448 and a very difficult standard to meet 
in most cases.449  It is no coincidence that modern color-based equal protec-
tion arose in a case involving Batson challenges, the one area of equal pro-
tection where direct evidence (or strong circumstantial evidence) is not nec-
essary for a viable claim.  Batson challenges are a unique branch of equal 
protection: They create presumptions of intent if certain criteria are met, 
shifting the burden to prosecutors to rebut such a presumption.450  Beyond 
Batson and other rebuttable presumptions of intent, civil rights advocates will 
need novel legal frameworks. 
One proposed means to address the intent doctrine is use of research on 
implicit bias: “attitudes or stereotypes that affect . . . understanding, actions, 
and decisions in an unconscious manner.”451  Legal scholars and advocates 
                                                          
 446.  Social science data were cited in the Bridgeforth opinion.  See supra note 392 and accom-
panying text.  However, such data was not used for an element of the claim itself.  
 447.  See Margolis, supra note 11, at 2091–93 (making doctrinal and statutory argument that 
California should adopt color as Batson class). 
 448.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1976).   
 449.  For a classic treatment of problems with the intent doctrine and a proposed solution, see 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Rac-
ism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355–58 (1987) (proposing a “‘cultural meaning’ test” to replace intent 
requirement for equal protection claims).  Given the current composition of the Supreme Court, 
federal courts are highly unlikely to adopt Professor Lawrence’s proposed test.  See infra text ac-
companying notes 459–462. 
 450.  See supra note 3.  Title VII disparate treatment claims also create such presumptions under 
the McDonnell-Douglas framework.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–
03 (1973) (holding that plaintiffs can create a prima facie case of intentional discrimination and shift 
burden to defendant to proffer non-discriminatory motive). 
 451.  Understanding Implicit Bias, KIRWAN INST. FOR STUDY RACE AND ETHNICITY, http://kir-
waninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/ (last visited May 11, 2020); see also 
MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD 
PEOPLE (2013).  For a critique of implicit bias research, see Frederick L. Oswald et al., Predicting 
Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 171 (2013).  For a broader critique of the focus on implicit bias to address 
 
2020] CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN LIVING COLOR 949 
have argued for incorporating implicit bias into equal protection doctrine and 
other existing anti-discrimination frameworks.452  Results from implicit bias 
research have consistently shown that a majority of Americans associate 
white and light skin with positive attributes and black and dark skin with 
negative attributes.453 
As with color discrimination itself, juror selection is an area where the 
law has begun to embrace implicit bias.  In April 2017, the Washington Su-
preme Court adopted General Rule 37,454 becoming the first American court 
to address implicit bias in the selection of juries.455  General Rule 37 states: 
“If the court determines that an objective observer could view race or ethnic-
ity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the peremptory 
challenge shall be denied.  The court need not find purposeful discrimination 
to deny the peremptory challenge.”456  The rule makes it clear that “an objec-
tive observer is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in 
addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion 
of potential jurors in Washington State.”457 
If implicit bias can be incorporated into civil rights law, the law cannot 
only address unconscious forms of racism, but colorism-related research 
might one day lead to additional legal protections against color discrimina-
tion.458  It is also noteworthy that both the recognition of skin color discrim-
ination and the acknowledgment of implicit bias in juror selection occurred 
                                                          
racial inequities, see JONATHAN KAHN, RACE ON THE BRAIN: WHAT IMPLICIT BIAS GETS WRONG 
ABOUT THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (2017). 
 452.  See, e.g., Alyson Grine & Emily Coward, Recognizing Implicit Bias Within the Equal Pro-
tection Framework, TRIAL BRIEFS, Apr. 2017, at 26.  For example, one proposal has been to create 
presumptions of motive based on statistical or circumstantial evidence: For racial profiling by police 
officers, these may include statistical disparities in police stops.  Id.  But see McClesky v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statistical evidence of racial disparities in application of capital 
punishment did not demonstrate discriminatory motive).   
 453.  See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html (last visited 
May 11, 2020).  The most common test of implicit bias is the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), 
which involves pairing positive and negative words with characteristics such as race, skin color, and 
gender.  Id.  One study of implicit bias found that “[c]olor . . . had a large, unambiguous effect that 
was independent of race” and that “[t]he magnitude of the effect of race . . . depended primarily on 
color. . . . darker skin magnified the effect of race [and] exacerbated stereotypical beliefs.”  Vesla 
M. Weaver, The Electoral Consequences of Skin Color: The “Hidden” Side of Race in Politics, 34 
POL. BEHAV. 159, 188 (2012).  
 454.  WASH. GEN. R. 37.  
 455.  See New Rule Addresses Failings of U.S. Supreme Court Decision, ACLU (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/washington-supreme-court-first-nation-adopt-rule-reduce-implicit-ra-
cial-bias-jury-selection.  
 456.  WASH. GEN. R. 37(e). 
 457.  WASH. GEN. R. 37(f). 
 458.  Bennett & Plaut, supra note 440, at 800 (recommending that “judges, court staff, probation 
officers, prosecutors, and defense lawyers . . . have the experience of taking an implicit association 
test”).  One of the authors, Mark W. Bennett, is himself a federal judge.  Id. at 745. 
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at the state level rather than in the federal courts.  As the next Section lays 
out, states are currently the best venues for these kinds of innovations in civil 
rights law. 
2.  State Civil Rights Law 
For several decades now, the United States Supreme Court has narrowed 
the scope of civil rights protections for minority groups, seriously eroding the 
notion of strict scrutiny articulated in Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene 
Products.459  The major trend in federal constitutional doctrine has been the 
anticlassification view of equal protection.460  Rooted in this view, the most 
prominent recent equal protection cases have involved challenges to affirm-
ative action programs which benefit racial minorities.461  Given the current 
composition of the Supreme Court, attempts to expand the scope of federal 
protections against color discrimination would likely be futile for many years 
to come.  Nevertheless, Bridgeforth provides another lesson here—one about 
the potential of state courts.  Currently, state civil rights laws provide the 
most promising vehicle for expanding legal protections against color discrim-
ination.462 
Often, state laws have been an impediment to civil rights,463 but that is 
not always the case.464  In the current judicial climate, state governments pro-
vide the most promising venue for development of anti-discrimination law.  
Forty years ago, with federal courts becoming increasingly conservative, Jus-
tice William Brennan famously called civil rights lawyers to look to state 
                                                          
 459.  304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may 
be a special condition . . . which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 460.  See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 268. 
 461.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 462.  Like New York, many other state constitutions incorporate equal protection or other pro-
visions that protect against color discrimination.  See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[N]or shall 
any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity; nor exempted from any burden or 
duty, on account of race [or] color . . . .”); CONN. CONST. art I, § 20 (“No person shall be denied the 
equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or en-
joyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, [or] color . . . .”); MA. CONST. 
pt. I, art. I (“Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed 
or national origin.”); MT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“No person shall be denied the equal protection of the 
laws.  Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against 
any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race [or] color . . . .”); N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person 
be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race [or] color . . . .”); TX. CONST art. I, § 3a 
(“Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or na-
tional origin.”); WY. CONST art. I, § 3 (“Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights 
is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting the political rights and 
privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race [or] color . . . .”). 
 463.  See Jeff Nilsson, The Civil Rights Act vs. States’ Rights, SATURDAY EVENING POST (July 
2, 2014), https://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/2014/07/the-civil-rights-act-vs-states-rights/. 
 464.  See, e.g., infra notes 467–468. 
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constitutions for future pursuit of individual rights.465  State constitutions 
have been “a rich source of protection for equality.”466  School finance liti-
gation under state constitutions has been quite successful,467 and most re-
cently, same-sex marriage rights also developed under state constitutional 
rulings,468 which influenced other states and then eventually the federal 
courts to guarantee the same rights.469  Through a process of strategic litiga-
tion and lobbying, color-based anti-discrimination law could be another area 
where “courageous [s]tate[s] may . . . serve as . . . laborator[ies]; and try 
novel social and economic experiments”470 in the pursuit of equality. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered the changing relationship between race and 
color in civil rights law.  The term “color” has at times actually denoted race 
                                                          
 465.  Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in 
School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301 (2011); Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorpo-
ration of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011); William J. Brennan, Jr., State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also Katie 
Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1342-68 (2018); Helen 
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999) (discussing standards of review that state courts should apply in as-
sessing whether state constitutional obligations are being met); Sanford Levinson, America’s 
“Other Constitutions”: The Importance of State Constitutions for Our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA 
L. REV. 813 (2010); Hon. Jenny Rivera, State High Courts and Individual Rights: The New York 
State Court of Appeals Recent Jurisprudence, From Skin-Color Based Peremptory Challenges to 
the Right of Sepulcher, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 1107 (2018); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equal-
ity in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013 (2003); Vinay Harpalani, Note, Maintaining 
Educational Adequacy in Times of Recession: Judicial Review of State Education Budgets, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 258 (2010). 
 466.  Shaman, supra note 465, at 1018. 
 467.  See MICHAEL REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH 
THE STATE COURTS (2009). 
 468.  See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding prohibitions on same-
sex marriage to violate the Iowa Constitution).  For other state court rulings with similar holdings, 
see Eyer, supra note 465, at 1344 n.126.  Also, Mary Bonauto and James Esseks discuss how in 
strategizing the legal effort to strike down bans on same-sex marriage, they began by bringing state 
constitutional cases: 
[W]e wanted the focus to be on the State’s decisions about how to treat people. . . . We 
also did not want to federalize the issue at that time but instead to break through the 
historic barriers, get to a win and hold it, and . . . . develop a patchwork where some states 
allowed marriage, even as others didn’t, and get to a point where we could ask for a 
national resolution.   
Mary Bonauto & James Esseks, Marriage Equality Advocacy from the Trenches, 29 COLUM. J. OF 
GENDER & L. 117, 120 (2015). 
 469.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding prohibitions on same-sex mar-
riage to violate the U.S. Constitution).   
 470.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Jus-
tice Louis Brandeis’s opinion in Liebmann laid out the idea of states as “laboratories” of experi-
mentation for social policy.  Id.  
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and at other times referred directly to skin color.471  This ambiguity was ap-
parent in the antebellum era and Reconstruction Era laws,472 and in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.473  Although it was known and un-
disputed that skin color did not always determine race, judges and others of-
ten gave heavy weight to skin color when identifying an individual’s race.474  
In particular, those with relatively dark skin were presumed to be Black.475 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court 
recognized both race and color discrimination under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but it did not differentiate between the two.476  Skin color was often 
presumed to be the means to identify race, but no separate jurisprudence de-
veloped around color discrimination.477  Gradually, use of “color” became 
much less common in the Supreme Court’s equal protection opinions: Often 
the term was used just when quoting prior cases.478 
Nevertheless, after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, color 
discrimination re-emerged under Title VII of that act and under other civil 
rights statutes.479  Under these statutes, courts distinguished between race and 
color discrimination, with the later referring specifically to skin color bias 
independent of race.480  Color discrimination cases brought under these stat-
utes typically involved a single plaintiff of one race-color subclass: for ex-
ample, a dark-skinned African American. 
People v. Bridgeforth added a novel dimension to “color” discrimina-
tion jurisprudence.481  For the first time, a court recognized a multiracial color 
class, made up of individuals of different races linked solely by their dark 
skin color.482  Bridgeforth was limited to New York’s Equal Protection 
Clause and Section 13 of New York’s Civil Rights Law,483 but it opens up 
possibilities for future developments in color discrimination law.484 
                                                          
 471.  See supra Part I. 
 472.  See supra Part II. 
 473.  See supra Part III. 
 474.  See supra text accompanying notes 105, 118; see also United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101, 
102 (5th Cir. 1910) (holding that Petitioner Abba Dolla was White because the “skin of [Dolla’s] 
arm . . . was sufficiently transparent for the blue color of the veins to show very clearly”). 
 475.  See supra text accompanying note 105. 
 476.  See supra Part III. 
 477.  See supra Part III. 
 478.  See supra Part IV. 
 479.  See supra Part V. 
 480.  See supra Part V. 
 481.  69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016). 
 482.  Id.; see supra Part VI.D. 
 483.  See supra Part VI.D. 
 484.  See supra Part VII. 
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As American racism becomes more complex and intersects even more 
with colorism, multiracial color classes will become more relevant and im-
portant for civil rights law.485  Civil rights advocates will need to collect data 
on skin color discrimination and employ creative legal strategies to address 
it.486  In the broader scope, this can move American civil rights law in a more 
progressive direction.  A century and a half after the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment, “color” itself may help to change the “colorblind” ideol-
ogy487 that has stifled civil rights law in America. 
                                                          
 485.  See supra Part VII.A–B. 
 486.  See supra Part VII.D. 
 487.  See supra text accompanying note 268. 
